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Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases
ANUP MALANI & JONATHAN S. MASUR *

INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental goals of a patent system is to encourage the
research and development of the most socially valuable inventions—those
innovations that will produce the greatest benefits for society at large. If the
government could determine in advance which inventions are most socially
valuable, it could simply offer direct rewards for their development. 1 The
fact that the United States has chosen to employ patents rather than direct
rewards to encourage innovation reflects a decision to decentralize the task
of picking winners. This policy choice is premised on the notion that, if
inventors or the market are in a better position than the government to
identify valuable innovations, the government should delegate the task by
granting inventors a patent as a reward for innovation. 2 Patents entitle
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1
See Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property
Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 534–36 (2001); see also Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A
Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137, 1137–38 (1998) (“Under
symmetric information and full commitment, the first-best solution to underprovision of
ideas is subsidizing research, rather than creating a new set of monopoly price distortions
through the patent system. However, before research is conducted, the government may not
know the costs and expected benefits of research, and may not even be able to conceive of
some inventions.” (citations omitted)).
2
Of course there are other reasons one might still prefer a reward system to a patent
system. For example, a reward system that released the innovation into the public domain
would impose less deadweight loss to welfare. The information advantage of inventors is a
necessary but not sufficient condition to preferring patents over rewards.
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inventors to monopoly profits from an innovation, 3 and monopoly profits
tend to increase as the social value of an innovation increases. 4 Thus, the
patent system generally encourages inventors to work on what they believe
will be the most valuable inventions.
This rationale for choosing a patent system over a reward system
explains why the government may choose to grant patents in the first place.
It does not explain, however, why the government sometimes takes patents
away after they have been granted. These patent revocations are commonly
triggered when the defendant in a patent infringement case successfully
challenges the validity of the patent held by the plaintiff. 5 The logic behind
patent challenges and revocations is that the government, when
implementing a patent system, might accidentally give out patents to
entities that did not innovate or did not need a reward in order to innovate. 6
Such invalid patents have no upside: they do not encourage innovation, and
they impose deadweight losses on welfare. In short, patent challenges weed
out invalid patents. 7
3

Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 1, at 529.
This claims rests on the absence of any a priori reason why the fraction of social
surplus extracted by a monopolist rises or falls with the size of that surplus. See infra
section I.A.
5
Patents can also be revoked via administrative proceedings before the Patent and
Trademark Office. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301 –329 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
6
The likely reason for these mistakes is that the Patent and Trademark Office must
make decisions about which applicants deserve patents with very little information about
their innovation beyond that which the applicant itself provides. Peer review does not come
until later, when profit sharing becomes a motive for an infringer to provide the
government with more balanced information about the validity of a patent. See infra
section I.B.
7
Scholars have criticized patent law for making mistakes in weeding out socially
worthless patents. The gist of the argument is that the criteria patent law employs to judge
the validity of, say, utility patents—novelty, non-obviousness, and utility—do not perfectly
identify those innovations that improve social welfare, as an economist might define it.
Accordingly, the argument goes, these criteria do not successfully induce valuable
innovation while deterring socially worthless research. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND
POLICY 6–8 (2003), available at http:// www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; ADAM
B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT
SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 24–35
(2004); Jay Dratler, Jr., Alice in Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent System, 38 AKRON L.
REV. 299 (2005). We share these concerns, but we have little to add to them and they do
not affect the arguments we make later in the text about the problem with patent challenges
and potential reforms to improve those challenges. Therefore, we proceed under the
4
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There are two problems, however, with patent challenges. In some cases
they impose costs on valid patents, and in other cases they fail against
invalid patents. These flaws stem from two sources. First, infringers
occasionally bring challenges even when patents are valid, causing the
holders of valid patents to bear litigation costs in responding to a patent
challenge. At the same time, alleged infringers may fail to challenge all
holders of invalid patents, allowing these patents to continue imposing
deadweight loss. Second, occasionally courts may make an error when
judging whether a patent is valid or invalid. This may cause the holder of
what is truly a valid patent to lose that patent or allow an invalid patent to
stand. These failures decrease the ex ante returns to any innovation that
deserves a valid patent, undermining the incentives at the core of the patent
system, and increase the social costs of the patent system.
Moreover, these failures are most acute in cases involving the most
socially valuable patents and the largest firms. Whereas the patent system
seeks to decentralize the choice of innovation, patent litigation also
decentralizes the decision to challenge a patent. Specifically, it delegates the
decision to private parties, ideally potential entrants into the patent holder’s
market. However, there may be few firms in a position to challenge a patent
and large fixed litigation costs to filing a challenge. Thus challengers tend
to target holders of the most profitable and (and often most socially
valuable) patents. 8 Smaller patent holders are particularly vulnerable
because they cannot afford substantial litigation costs. By implication,
challengers tend to avoid taking on larger firms because there is a lower
likelihood of succeeding against even an invalid patent held by such firms. 9
This discourages innovation at smaller firms and tolerates socially harmful
patents held by larger firms.
At bottom, the problems with patent challenges are primarily
attributable to judicial and administrative errors. If the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) granted only valid patents, or if the courts could
be trusted to uphold all valid patents and strike down all invalid ones, our
assumption that the law determining which patents are valid operates as a reasonable proxy
for which patents (and the inventions they protect) increase social welfare. We shall focus
instead on errors in application of that law by courts.
8
C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug
Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 613, 632 (2011).
9
Michaxel J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Law, 45
HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1234 (2008) (detailing numerous advantages of large firms over small
firms in the use of intellectual property for profit and in litigation).
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system of patent challenges would function almost perfectly. Yet errors are
endemic throughout all levels of the process. The PTO issues scores of
invalid patents every year, 10 and the federal courts are notoriously
inaccurate when adjudicating patent validity. 11
If judicial and administrative inaccuracy is the disease, then improving
that accuracy would seem the most obvious cure. Indeed, proposals to
reduce the error rate within the federal courts and the PTO are legion and
involve everything from increased funding and technical training to fullscale restructuring of the judicial process. 12 Nonetheless, the patent
system’s endemic errors and inaccuracies have proven notoriously resilient
in the face of ongoing ameliorative efforts. 13 It may be that there are upper
limits to the level of precision that generalist judges can bring to a system
involving such technically complex subject matters, for instance. 14
In this Article, we suggest that it might be possible to improve the value
of patent challenges even without increasing their accuracy. Put simply, we
10

E.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 7, at 32–33 (describing a patent granted based on
the “determination that surrounding jam with peanut butter so the bread will not get soggy
is a new idea, and one that was not previously obvious to skilled sandwich-makers”); Mark
A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. L. REV. 1495, 1495 &
n.1 (2001) (“Complaints are legion.”); Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat,
What To Do About Bad Patents?, REGULATION, Winter 2005–2006, at 10, 10 (2005) (“Bad
patents are everywhere.”); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s
Presumption Of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 (2007) (arguing that PTO grants “patents
that should never have been issued” because of presumption of validity in judicial review);
Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights
for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589
(1999) (noting that “patents for ‘business methods’ implemented in software . . . are of
extremely poor quality”); Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 675, 676 (2009) (describing how “PTO struggles to improve examination
quality”).
11
See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 258–59 (2008)
(demonstrating that even sophisticated and experienced federal courts struggle with patent
cases).
12
We describe and critique these various proposals in section III.A, infra.
13
See, e.g., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen
A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (describing a continuing crisis within the patent system); Peter
S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s Embrace of Intellectual Property: True Love
or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 737 (2007) (describing “a growing
patent crisis”); see also Schwartz, supra note 11, at 258–59 (demonstrating that judges to
not appear to improve as they gain experience with patent cases).
14
See infra section III.A.
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propose raising the stakes involved in patent litigation. A patent owner who
prevails at trial should collect enhanced rewards, above and beyond the
damages the owner would normally be paid in compensation for the
infringement. A patent owner whose patent is invalidated at trial should be
forced to pay significantly enhanced penalties. At first glance, our proposal
might seem entirely counterintuitive. If patent adjudications are riddled with
errors, one would think that it would be preferable to lower the stakes
involved, rather than increase them. Scholars and courts have largely
confined themselves to that approach. 15
Yet contrary to the conventional wisdom, we demonstrate that enhanced
rewards and penalties can correct many of the flaws inherent to patent
challenges even without affecting the accuracy of the adjudications
themselves. They accomplish this by restoring patent holders’ net expected
trial outcomes to appropriate levels. 16 Enhanced rewards would compensate
holders of valid, valuable patents for the risks they run at trial. This would
incentivize the optimal amount of research and innovation, as well as
continued research on the most socially valuable inventions. At the same
time, enhanced penalties would reduce or eliminate invalid patent owners’
opportunities to earn positive returns at trial, vastly diminishing their
incentives to assert their invalid patents in the first place. 17

15

See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
In a way, our proposal is related to Gary Becker’s observation that deterrence is a
function of the probability of apprehension times the fine paid upon apprehension. See
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
172, 180 (1968). Focusing on improving the accuracy of courts is akin to changing the
probability of apprehension, although our proposal to raise stakes is akin to changing the
criminal fine. Our proposal is also related, though less directly, to Keith Hylton’s
observation that the enforcer’s dilemma that plaintiffs face can be overcome by type II
errors by courts. In other words, plaintiffs can be encouraged to litigate by courts who
accidentally rule for them. See Keith L. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under
Negligence, 6 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 433, 434 (1990). We make an opposite point: court (and
PTO) errors in favor of patent holders can be overcome by increasing the penalties that
invalid patent holders pay when their patent is invalidated.
17
Our proposal resembles, but is distinct from, the English Rule, which requires that
the losing party in a civil litigation compensate the prevailing party for its direct litigation
costs. First, our remedy allows an increase in damages that substantially exceed the cost of
litigation. Second, we advocate disconnecting the amount that the prevailing party received
from the amount that the losing party pays. For example, we advocate giving prevailing
patent holders patent extensions, though those patent extensions would not be paid for by
infringers. See infra section III.D.
16
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The enhanced rewards and penalties we propose would thus allow our
imperfect patent system to mimic one in which courts erred less frequently.
Patent owners—be they genuine innovators or patent trolls—and their
competitors would behave as if they could rely upon the courts to reach the
correct outcome in essentially every case. The system would generate
substantial benefits to innovation and competition at minimal cost. Where
direct efforts to improve judicial accuracy have failed, raising the stakes of
patent cases might yet succeed.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the manner in which
patents direct research and innovation toward the most socially valuable
inventions and describes the value of patent challenges. Part II analyzes the
problems created by patent challenges when courts err in assessing the
validity of patents. Part III presents our proposal for enhanced rewards and
penalties and offers a theoretical demonstration of its ability to realign
research and litigation incentives. Part IV suggests a useful refinement that
would involve tailoring the availability of enhanced remedies and penalties
to particular industries or technical fields and examines several important
issues surrounding the implementation and effects of our approach.
I. THE LOGIC BEHIND PATENTS AND PATENT CHALLENGES
In this Part, we first examine the rationale behind the existence of
patents and then the process by which patents are granted and revoked.
A. PATENTS AND PROPORTIONAL REWARDS

The patent system is premised on the idea that an inventor’s payoff for
innovation should be proportional to the ex post social surplus from that
innovation. 18 Our evidence is that the payoff to the inventor of possessing a
patent is the monopoly profits from having the exclusive right to market her
innovation. Monopoly profits are not special in and of themselves. Indeed,
monopoly pricing is in general associated with deadweight loss to welfare,
which is typically considered a cost of the patent system. However,
monopoly profits have the useful feature that they roughly scale with the
social surplus from an innovation. In other words, the patent on an
18

By ex post social surplus we mean the consumer plus producer surplus from an
invention after it is developed. This surplus excludes the cost of research required to
develop the invention.
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innovation with twice the social value of another will typically generate
twice the monopoly profits of the other. The reason is that, of the factors
that determine monopoly profits (the level of demand, the slope of demand,
the ability to price discriminate, and competition from other patents), only
the level of demand must a priori scale with social value. 19 There is no
theoretical reason why the other factors are correlated with the ex post
social surplus from an invention.
The reason why the patent system seeks to scale rewards with ex post
social surplus is not primarily that this scaling is, in general, the optimal
strategy for encouraging innovation. It is easy enough to see that, for
example, if there are diminishing returns to rewards or increasing cost to the
use of rewards, then rewards should be roughly concave in the ex post
surplus from an innovation. 20 Rewards in turn may have diminishing returns
because individuals have diminishing marginal utility of income and thus
inventors exert less incremental effort as reward rises. 21 And the cost of
rewards may be increasing if there are fixed costs to entering a patent race,
19

For a definition of consumer surplus and its relationship to both the demand curve
and social welfare, see Daniel T. Slesnick, Empirical Approaches to the Measurement of
Welfare, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 2108, 2110–13 (1998).
20
We can demonstrate this with a simple model similar to that employed by Shavell &
van Ypersele, supra note 1, at 530–32. Suppose the probability of generating an invention
is 𝑝(𝑟) where 𝑟 is the reward for an innovation, 𝑉 is the social value from an invention,
𝑐(𝑟) is the cost of providing a reward. Costs might include the costs of a patent race or
simply the costs of administering a patent system. The social welfare accounting for the
reward is 𝑊 = 𝑝(𝑟)𝑉 – 𝑐(𝑟). The level of reward that maximizes social welfare satisfies
the condition 𝑝′(𝑟)𝑆 = 𝑐′(𝑟), that is, the marginal benefits of rewards must equal their
marginal costs. Because rewards 𝑟 and social value 𝑉 are complements, i.e., 𝑑 2 𝑊/
𝑑𝑟𝑑𝑉 = 𝑝′(𝑟) > 0, and the upper bound on rewards, 𝑟 < 𝑉, obviously increases with 𝑉,
the optimal reward is increasing in the social value of the innovation by Topkis’s
Monotonicity Theorem. Donald M. Topkis, Minimizing a Submodular Function on a
Lattice, 26 OPERATIONS RES. 305, 317 (1978). Moreover, it is easily verified that, unless
𝑝(𝑟) and 𝑐(𝑟) are linear or the upper bound on rewards is binding, the optimal reward is
nonlinear.
21
This concern vanishes if innovations are created by firms which are held by
diversified shareholders and thus do not experience diminishing marginal utility of income.
Of course, some innovations are made by individuals or privately held firms with limited
shareholders. And even in large corporations, agency problems between managers and
shareholders can mimic the results from diminishing marginal utility of income. This is
most evident when the chief executive is paid a fraction of profits; because the chief
executive experiences diminishing returns and controls the corporation, the corporation
will behave as if it has diminishing returns. See also JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 42 (1988).
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so that multiple inventors only compete when the reward is large enough to
cover their fixed costs.
Rather, the main reason why the patent system provides rewards that are
proportional to ex post social surplus from an innovation is that the
government does not know which innovations actually enhance social
welfare. The system functions under the assumption that potential inventors
and the market have better knowledge about the value of their invention. To
encourage inventors to exert most of their effort on developing innovations
that are socially productive, the system uses the incentive of a reward that
scales with ex post social surplus. 22 In other words, the proportional reward
from patents is the solution to a principal–agent problem in which the
principal is the government and the agent is an inventor. The agent has
private information on which project yields the greatest surplus. The
government incentivizes the agent to choose the project that is most
valuable by giving her a fixed portion of surplus from the project she
chooses (and completes).
To illustrate this point, consider a principal–agent model where the
agent may work on either of two projects, 0 or 1. Due to time constraints,
the agent cannot work on both. The cost to the agent of working on either
project is the same, 𝑐, and her reservation wage is normalized to 0. If
executed, projects have payoffs of 𝜃0 > 0 and 𝜃1 = 𝜃0 + 𝜖, respectively,
where 𝜖 takes a value of 1 or -1 with equal probability. Suppose that both
principal and agent know the payoff to project 0, but only the agent knows
the value of 𝜖 before any project is undertaken, that is, 𝜃0 is common
knowledge but the agent has private information on 𝜖. 23 The payoff to the
principal is 𝜃0 + 𝕀1 𝜖 − 𝑤(𝜃0 , 𝕀1 ), where 𝕀1 is an indicator for whether the
agent chose project 1 and 𝑤 is a wage that may depend on information
available to the principal, namely, the value of project 0 and whether the
agent works on project 0 or 1. We assume a risk-neutral agent who obtains a
payoff of 𝑤(𝜃0 , 𝕀1 ) − 𝑐 if she works on either project and 0, her reservation
wage, if she does not. It is easy to verify that the principal’s optimal
strategy is to sell the choice between projects (as well as the return to the
projects) to the agent for a cost of 𝜃0 and the agent will accept because
𝐸(𝜖) ≥ 𝑅 = 0. This equilibrium also coincides with the first best because
22

The reward also incorporates the cost of research and development.
The principal may not know the payoff to project 1 either because the payoff goes to
some other third party the principal cares about or because it is realized well after a wage
must be paid to the agent.
23
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the agent is risk neutral. 24 For our purposes, the result shows that when the
agent has private information on the value of projects, she should be
incentivized to choose the right one by giving a wage equal to payoff from
the projects, even if the cost of research and development are the same for
both projects. 25
B. PATENTABILITY STANDARDS, PATENT APPLICATIONS, AND PATENT
CHALLENGES

The above rationale for the patent system assumes, first, that
innovations do not occur without rewards and, second, that patents end up
in the hands of people who develop innovations. Neither assumption is
appropriate in all cases. Some innovations emerge without explicit rewards,
or at least without rewards from the government. 26 Prominent examples
include academic medical research, 27 freeware software, 28 and fashion

If the agent is risk averse and the principal did not observe 𝜖, it would still be the
optimal strategy for the principal to offer to sell the choice and payoffs to the agent for 𝜃0 .
However, because the agent suffers a utility loss from the random variable 𝜖, this strategy
is not first best. The principal will not sell for less than 𝜃0 to provide the agent with some
compensating insurance because the principal would do better by simply offering the agent
a small positive wage (lower than the contemplated price discount) to work on project 0
and no wage to work on project 1.
25
If the agent were risk averse and the principal received a noisy but informative
signal about 𝜖, the optimal contract would be proportional to (monotonic in) the signal, and
thus to 𝜖, which proxies for social surplus. There is no a priori reason why the contract
would be concave or convex in that signal.
26
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Ziv Shafir, Who Chooses Open-Source Software?, 78
U. CHI. L. REV. 139 (2011) (describing the intersection of academic research and open
source software); Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the
Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1504–07 (1997) (discussing the history of freeware
and its philosophical opposition to traditional intellectual property rights).
27
Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Ethical Issues
in the Patenting of Medical Procedures, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 341, 349 (1998) (rejecting
“the argument that the patenting of medical processes is necessary to enable and promote
[medical] procedural advances” and arguing that decades of medical advancement occurred
“despite the absence of medical process patents”); Wendy W. Yang, Note, Patent Policy
and Medical Procedure Patents: The Case for Statutory Exclusion from Patentability, 1
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 5 par. 17 (1995) (arguing that the inherent incentives of the
scientific community can supplant “economic incentive[s] provided by patent
monopolies”).
28
See Heffan, supra note 26, at 1504–07.
24
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innovations. 29 Moreover, parties who have developed an innovation may
not be able to demonstrate that they did so and parties who did not develop
an innovation have an incentive to claim they did to obtain market power. If
parties innovate in the midst of competition, they may accidentally release
the innovation in the public domain before filing the paperwork required to
secure patent rights over the innovation. 30 On the flip side, there are
frequent complaints about “patent trolls” or “non-practicing entities”
(NPEs) who either patent ideas that require little research or purchase
patents based on others’ research, then do not make any risky investment to
develop those patented ideas. 31 Instead, critics contend, an NPE waits until
some other party takes the expense and risk to commercialize these ideas
and, if the other party is successful, files an infringement suit to extract a
portion of the latter’s profits. 32
29

Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1689 (2006).
30
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (patent is invalid if the invention
was published or in public use more than one year before the patent application was filed).
In March 2012, the provisions of the America Invents Act amending § 102 section come
into effect, generally replacing the one-year provision with a bar of public disclosure or use
at any time before the patent’s effective filing date, subject to certain exceptions. See Pub.
L. No. 112-29, §3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011).
In the pharmaceutical industry, the problem of innovators being unable to secure
patent rights is particularly acute. Pharmaceutical development involves both discovery of
a molecule and demonstration that it is effective at treating humans in clinical trial. Patents
are granted, however, after discovery and before the trials. Moreover, a single molecule
may have multiple medical applications, not all evident when the molecule was discovery.
If the idea for a particular application lags substantially behind the discovery, the molecule
may enter the public domain (become generic) before the particular application is
demonstrated. In other words, the innovative but belated application cannot be protected by
patent rights. Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability,
87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 519–21 (2009).
31
See, e.g., John R. Allison et. al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat
Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 691–95 (2011) (detailing the practices of “patent trolls”
and their litigation habits).
32
See Walter O. Alomar-Jiménez, Harmonizing Ebay, 1 U. P.R. BUS. L.J. 17, 24
(2010) (explaining that the modus operandis of patent trolls is “not invest[ing] in research
and development (R&D) to create their inventions,” purchasing patents “cheaply,”
monitoring the “technology field of his acquired patents,” suing “defendant-infringer[s],”
and “demanding a licensing fee”); Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and
Patent Trolls: A Novel “Cold Fusion” Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 407, 407 (2007) (“Instead of commercializing products, patent trolls
buy up patents (oftentimes older paper patents), wait for the technology and industry to
grow up around the patent, and then use the patent as a holdup device for extorting money
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A well-functioning patent system must have a way to ensure that patents
are not granted when they are either unnecessary or undeserved. The U.S.
patent system, like many others around the world, 33 solves these problems
in two complementary ways. First, it sets up criteria to judge when an
innovation deserves a patent. Specifically, the creation must be novel, nonobvious, and have some utility. 34 These doctrines, particularly the
requirements of novelty and non-obviousness, 35 are meant to determine
whether an invention has actually contributed any new knowledge to the
world. 36 The patent system then relies upon inventors’ incentives in the
marketplace to ensure that the invention is socially valuable. If the
invention has no value, there will be no market for it and no reason to invest
resources in creating it in the first place. If the invention is valuable and
non-obvious, then the inventor has presumably contributed some valuable
knowledge, and with it some social surplus. Patent law’s doctrines thus

from would-be defendants wishing to avoid the exorbitant costs of defending against an
overreaching broadly claimed invention.”).
33
For a description of the European patent system, see generally Patrick Coyle, Note,
Uniform Patent Litigation in the European Union: An Analysis of the Viability of Recent
Proposals Aimed at Unifying the European Patent Litigation System, 11 WASH. U. GLOB.
STUD. L. REV. 171 (2012). For comparisons of the United States, European, and Japanese
patent systems, see generally John R. Thomas, Litigation Beyond the Technological
Frontier: Comparative Approaches to Multinational Patent Enforcement, 27 LAW & POL’Y
INT’L BUS. 277, 282–88 (1996).
34
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 103 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
35
Utility only plays a meaningful role at the patent-granting stage for biotechnology
and chemistry patents. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law,
89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1644–46 (2003) (“In the last several decades . . . the utility
requirement has lost much of its force<no space>. . . .The only exceptions are biology and
chemistry.”). Even then, it mainly serves to prevent a firm from patenting a compound (or
genetic sequence) at too early a stage. The judgment is that it would be a mistake to allow
one firm to lock up a compound before they have any real use for it, removing it from the
public domain as a subject for study. But even here the utility hurdle is not all that high.
Demonstrated in vitro effects are enough to overcome it. In vivo effects on mice are also
enough. See also In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1995). (“Even chemical
similarity to other effective compounds is enough.”).
36
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to “promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries”).
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provide reasonable standards for judging when a patent is unnecessary or
undeserved—at least when they function correctly. 37
Second, the patent system applies these criteria at two different points
during the lifecycle of an innovation. 38 Before a product is
commercialized, 39 an inventor may apply for a patent with the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO). The office has been criticized, however, for
granting too many patent applications. 40 One reason is limited resources.
The PTO’s review is relatively cursory because it receives a very large
number of applications but is short-staffed. 41 In addition, the PTO only has
the information provided by the patent applicant and whatever limited
information the patent examiner is able to discover on her own. 42 Another
reason is poor incentives. PTO examiners lack the incentives to conduct
extensive searches for prior art, and their searches are notoriously less
37

Of course some scholars question whether the standards for patentability perfectly
correlate with the necessity and deservedness of patents. We addressed this point in note 7,
supra.
38
See Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735,
746–49 (2012).
39
Inventors file patent applications prior to commercialization for two basic reasons.
First, once a product is commercialized, the PTO might find that it is no longer novel. See
Richard H. Stern, The Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology, 47 U. PITT. L. REV.
1229, 1249 (1986) (“The subject matter of a patent must be novel, [that is] . . . not
disclosed in any prior publication or commercial product . . . .”). Thus commercialization
may preclude a successful patent application. Noel Courage, Sharing the (Genetic) Wealth,
35 TEX. INT’L L.J. 123, 123–24 (2000) (reviewing KRISHNA R. DRONAMRAJU, BIOLOGICAL
AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY SHARING (1998)) (“[S]cientifically novel
inventions are not patentable [when] . . . the invention was publicly disclosed prior to filing
a patent application. Inventions lacking legal novelty are barred from patent protection . . .
.” (footnote omitted)). Second, without a patent, the inventor will face competition during
the commercialization process. This may reduce the returns to commercialization. See
Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120
YALE L.J. 1590, 1648 (2011) (“A patent on a nascent technology . . . can give the patentee
‘an incentive to make investments to maximize the value of the patent without fear that the
fruits of the investment will produce unpatentable information appropriable by
competitors’ . . . .” (quoting Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276 (1977)); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property
Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 709–10 (2001) (describing
the effects of competition in the commercialization process and noting the additional costs
borne by the innovating party due to competition).
40
See supra note 10. However, it is possibly that this lax screening is socially optimal.
See infra Part III; see also Lemley, supra note 10, at 1495 n.1.
41
Lemley, supra note 10, at 1499–1500.
42
Id. at 1500.
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complete and successful than the searches performed by opposing parties in
the course of litigation. 43
Moreover, the PTO has a stronger incentive to accept applications than
reject them. If the agency accepts the patent application, it is unlikely any
party will directly complain about the PTO’s decision. The work typically
has not been marketed and competitors have not emerged. By the time a
competitor does emerge, the validity of the patent will have shifted from the
jurisdiction of the PTO to that of the federal courts (typically the Federal
Circuit), where the matter will likely arise as an infringement action against
the competitor. However, if the patent application is rejected, the applicant
has an incentive immediately to appeal the PTO’s decision. The PTO,
seeking to avoid the cost of appeals and the shame of reversal, errs on the
side of granting applications. 44
Patentability criteria (novelty, value, non-obviousness) may be applied a
second time after the patent has been granted. A typical case is where a
competitor emerges with a product similar to that described in a patent and
the patent holder files a lawsuit alleging patent infringement. In order for a
patent to have value when asserted against a competitor, it must of course
be both valid and infringed. Therefore, as a defense, the competitor may
assert that the plaintiff’s patent is, in fact, invalid. 45 If the court agrees, the
43

Merges, supra note 10, at 603 (describing patent examiner incentives); Kristen
Dietly, Note, Lightening the Load: Whether the Burden of Proof for Overcoming A
Patent’s Presumption of Validity Should Be Lowered, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2615, 2655–56
(2010) (discussing the weaknesses of PTO examinations and arguing against the
presumption of deference to the PTO).
44
Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 474 (2011).
45
As we will reiterate below, we need not define a patent challenge to require an
assertion that a patent is invalid. When an infringement suit is filed, the alleged infringer
will simultaneously assert that the patent is invalid and, if valid, not infringed. A patent
challenge can equally take the form of an argument that the competing product does not
infringe the patent. A finding of non-infringement, however, may not always be as
damaging to patent holders as a finding of invalidity. After all, the patent holder can always
assert the patent against some other party. But in many cases the two have the same
functional effect and the same stakes. For instance, “patent trolls” often sue multiple
defendants—any firm that might be infringing their patents—simultaneously. Matthew
Fawcett & Jeremiah Chan, March of the Trolls: Footsteps Getting Louder, 13 INTELL.
PROP. L. BULL. 1, 18–19 (2008); but see 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (curbing
this practice for lawsuits adjudicated after the passage of the America Invents Act). Part of
the reason patent holders bring suit against every conceivable infringer simultaneously is
that sequential lawsuits raise the probability of the patent being invalidated in one suit and
thus rendered unusable in future lawsuits. In such a suit, a general finding of non-
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plaintiff’s patent is effectively revoked. This is the canonical example of
what we call a “patent challenge” by a private party, in this case a
competitor. 46
This is not the only way a patent challenge can play out. A firm that
wishes to challenge a patent can pursue a number of different options,
including filing a declaratory judgment action before getting sued for
infringement. Alternatively, in the pharmaceutical sector, the challenging
firm need not even market a product in order to infringe on a patent. All that
is required is the filing of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA)
to obtain Food and Drug Administration approval to market a generic
version of a previously approved “branded” drug. Under the Hatch–
Waxman Act, the application alone constitutes grounds for the maker of the
branded drug to assert a patent infringement claim. 47
The primary rationale for revisiting a patent grant in this manner is that,
for the reasons described above, the PTO grants many patents that are either
unnecessary or undeserved. This rationale does not, however, explain why
the PTO delegates the authority to trigger a patent challenge to private
infringement has the same effect as a finding of invalidity. In addition, a court’s
interpretation of a patent’s claims is often simultaneously determinative of both validity
and infringement. The two doctrines thus function frequently as substitutes: if the court
interprets the claims broadly, the patent is invalid, and if it interprets them narrowly the
patent is not infringed. Accordingly, we will treat these two doctrines largely as substitutes
for purposes of the discussion that follows.
46
We hasten to add that we mean no normative judgment in describing these suits as
“challenges.” Firms assert a great number of invalid patents every year; they also very
commonly attempt to interpret their own patents overly broadly in order to capture as much
productive economic conduct as possible. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or
Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1765–70
(2009); Ian Lampl, Establishing Rules for Resolving Markman Failures, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
1025, 1038–39 (2005). In these instances, patent challenges are highly socially valuable.
47
35 U.S.C. §271(e)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Under the Hatch–Waxman Act, the
generic drug maker must demonstrate that its drug is bioequivalent to the branded drug and
certify that it does not infringe on the branded drug’s patent before it can obtain the
approval of the Food and Drug Administration to market its product through the ANDA
process. As a reward for encouraging generic drug entry, the statute gives the first generic
maker to file for entry into a market 180 days during which it exclusively may compete
against the branded drug. This incentive encourages generic companies to file for entry
before the branded drug’s patent naturally expires (twenty years after it is granted). Once
the generic files an ANDA, the branded company has forty-five days to file an
infringement suit. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B) (2006); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for
Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1553, 1560–61 (2006) (summarizing generic entry under Hatch–Waxman).
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parties rather than simply revisiting its own decision after some time. 48 In
some sense the delegation is consistent with the move by the patent system
to decentralize the decision of innovations by allowing inventors to apply
for patents rather than offering rewards for innovations chosen by the
government. But decentralization by itself is not a virtue.
A better justification is that allowing another private party to challenge a
patent addresses the ex parte nature of the PTO approval process. 49 Private
parties often have better information about which patents are invalid and
stronger incentives to search for relevant information and litigate
vigorously. Accordingly, a patent challenge is typically brought by a private
party that wishes to market a good similar to that described in the patent.
Such a party will only exist if the patented work has positive economic
value and will litigate only if the patent imposes an economic cost on them.
This reduces the risk that court resources will be wasted on screening zerocost patents. These arguments are similar to the theoretical arguments given
for case-or-controversy and standing requirements that define who may
litigate cases generally. 50
II. THE FLAWS OF PATENT CHALLENGES
Although patent challenges may be necessary to weed out some invalid
patents, they have two important flaws. First, they sometimes result in valid
patents being invalidated (“false negatives”), thereby discouraging
innovation. Second, they sometimes fail against even invalid patents (“false
positives”), thereby allowing such patents to continue imposing costs on
innovators and consumers. We address these false negative and false
positive problems in turn.
We pause to note that here and elsewhere, we use the words “valid” and
“invalid” to mean “valid and infringed” and “invalid or not infringed,”
48

The PTO could also restrict its review to patents with positive economic value by
only reviewing patents that pay their maintenance fee. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) & (c) (2006).
If a patent has zero value, it is unlikely that the holder will pay the maintenance fee.
49
For a discussion of the ex parte nature of patent examination, see Lemley, supra
note 10, at 1524–25.
50
See Christian B. Sundquist, The First Principles of Standing: Privilege, System
Justification, and the Predictable Incoherence of Article III, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 119,
131 (2011) (“One classic defense of standing doctrine relies on the . . . argument that the
standing requirements are necessary to ensure that the judicial process is controlled by
plaintiffs with a sufficient stake in the litigation.”).
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respectively. Both infringement and validity are, of course, necessary
requirements before a patent holder is entitled to damages or a licensing fee.
We describe these patents as valid and invalid largely as a matter of
shorthand, but also to highlight the importance of the validity decision to
the value of the patent and the rights of the patent owner going forward. A
judgment of non-infringement may frustrate a patent owner in a single case
but the patent might still be worthwhile against other infringers, whereas a
judgment of invalidity ends the patent’s useful life. 51 Likewise, a patent
challenger who obtains a judgment of non-infringement may or may not aid
other potential challengers, while one who succeeds in invalidating a patent
has provided a public good that advantages similarly situated parties.
A. CHALLENGES AGAINST VALID PATENTS

When the owners of valid patents are forced into court, the
consequences can be severe. At minimum, such parties will be forced to pay
litigation costs to defend against validity challenges. More significantly,
federal courts may mistakenly invalidate truly valid patents. Not only are
the costs of litigation and the risks of improper invalidation significant, they
can also exert a differential impact on some of the most important and
vulnerable patent holders. First, patent challengers tend to target the most
profitable patents, imposing costs disproportionately on the most socially
valuable innovations. Second, patent challengers also tend to target the
smallest patent holders to maximize their chance of victory. These
tendencies diminish the fraction of social surplus from an innovation that
the patent holder captures, especially for the most valuable innovations and
the smallest innovators. This outcome is inconsistent with the basic premise
of the patent system, which is designed to allow inventors to capture a
greater percentage of the profits from their inventions as a means of
inducing innovation. It thus tends to undermine the value of the system.
1. Mistaken Challenges and Invalidation
Delegation of patent challenges to private parties has some benefits:
better knowledge about the costs of bad patents, better incentives to produce
51

See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (holding
that once a court has declared a patent invalid, the patent holder is estopped from asserting
that the patent is valid as against parties not involved in the original lawsuit).
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information on patents, and economizing on court resources. But even wellintentioned private parties are not perfect. They may accidentally challenge
patent holders that have truly valid patents. A rough indicator of this—if
one assumes that courts make no errors—is that courts validate roughly
55% of patents that are challenged. 52 On its face this suggests that the
holders of over half of challenged patents must pay litigation costs even
though the patents are valid, eating into the deserved payoff. 53
Of course, courts may accidentally validate truly invalid patents,
implying that the 55% validation rate is an overestimate of the errors that
challengers make when initiating suit. But, by the same token, courts may
accidentally invalidate truly valid patents, suggesting that the 45%
invalidation rate may include cases where valid patent holders were both
incorrectly targeted by challengers and were incorrectly found to hold
invalid patents by courts. 54 These valid patent holders do not simply pay
litigation costs; they also lose all future value from their patents. Thus,
incorrect court decisions impose even larger costs than correct court
decisions from the perspective of valid patent holders.
Why do we suspect that courts might mistakenly invalidate patents
when the popular sentiment in recent scholarship is to bemoan the patent
system’s lax standards for patenting? 55 Many of the arguments for why
courts may accidentally validate invalid patents are also arguments for why
they might invalidate valid patents. 56 For example, several scholars criticize
52

John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998). At the same time, only 25% of patents in lawsuits
are found valid and infringed, which indicates that a somewhat higher percentage of patent
challenges have merit. Mark A. Lemley, The Fractioning of Patent Law, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed., forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript
at
2–3),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1895681.
53
The low number of patent trials (roughly one hundred per year) may mask a high
number of valid patents that paid a cost due to challengers’ targeting errors. See Lemley,
supra note 10, at 1501. Approximately 85% of all patent cases settle before trial. Jay P.
Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination
of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 271
(2006).
54
If courts made no mistakes and patent challengers had perfect foresight, no holder of
a valid patent would ever be sued. We can reject this scenario, however, because it cannot
explain why 55% of patents are validated.
55
See supra note 10.
56
Another reason is that patent law’s standards for judging whether innovations
deserve patents—novelty, non-obviousness, patentability—and the doctrines that
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the Federal Circuit, which handles the bulk of appeals in patent litigation
cases, for promulgating weak standards for patentability. 57 Others have
noted the wide variation in validation rates across industries, 58 circuits,59
and, within jurisdictions, by whether cases are tried to the bench or to a
jury. 60 This may reflect not just randomness in litigation but variation in
underlying patentability standards. 61 Most concerning may be that prior
appellate reversals and job tenure do not improve the performance of
district courts judges in patent cases as measured by subsequent appellate
reversals. 62 Thus, judges do not appear to learn how to better apply the law.
Each of these flaws could translate to mistakes with either invalid or valid
patents.
Whatever the cause, imposing the risk of litigation and mistaken
invalidation on valid patents reduces the fraction of social surplus that an
inventor obtains through a patent. This results in a weakening of the

complement them may not be the best correlates of whether a patent is necessary to obtain
an innovation and whether that innovation has positive social value. See our caveat in note
7, supra.
57
See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written
Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 55, 62–69 (2000) (criticizing the formulation of the written description
requirement); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1111–12 (2004)
(finding that the Federal Circuit has been only mildly successful in promulgating a
coherent and predictable doctrine of claim construction); David O. Taylor, Clear but
Unconvincing: The Federal Circuit’s Invalidity Standard, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 293, 295–96 (2011).
58
Allison & Lemley, supra note 52, at 221–23 (finding variation in validation rates
across industries). Incidentally, litigation rates also vary by industry. John R. Allison et al.,
Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 477–78 (2003).
59
Allison & Lemley, supra note 52, at 192 (citing Gloria K. Koenig, PATENT
INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS (rev. ed. 1980)).
60
Id. at 212 (finding that juries are more likely to validate patents).
61
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1185 (2002) (suggesting the non-obviousness standard might be stated in
a manner that is harder for software patents to meet than for biotech patents to meet).
62
Schwartz, supra note 11, at 258–59 (finding neither evidence that district court
judges learn from prior appeals of their rulings nor a significant relationship between
judicial experience and performance). Of course, it is possible that appellate review in the
Federal Circuit is effectively random.

18

incentive the patent system employs to get inventors to work on the most
socially valuable patents. 63
2. Disproportionate Impacts on the Most Valuable Patents
One of the theoretical benefits of delegating patent challenges is that it
economizes on court resources. A challenger should not challenge a patent
with zero economic value because the market opened by the challenge is
unlikely to have value to the challenger and litigation has positive costs.
Unless litigation costs are positive but very small, however, this
economizing can go too far. If litigation has high marginal costs or large
fixed costs, patent challengers will only go after patents that are sufficiently
profitable to cover their litigation costs. If it costs $10 million for a firm to
pursue a patent challenge, 64 then its profits after successful litigation have to
be at least $10 million to warrant the challenge. Because profits after the
introduction of a competitor are lower than profits under a monopoly, the
patent holder (which had a monopoly) must lose more than $10 million in
payoff from the patent.
The problem is compounded if there are fewer competitors in a position
to challenge a patent holder than there are patents. In that case, the
challengers, if behaving optimally, will go after the most valuable patents,
not just the patents that—once invalidated—offer a payoff sufficient to
cover the cost of litigation. To illustrate, suppose that there are two patents
that could be challenged, one that provides $30 million in profits for its
patent holder and the other that provides $60 million in profits to its patent
holder, but only one firm that has the ability to challenge these two patents.
Suppose also that market-wide profits after entry of a competitor are twothirds the previous profits of the patent holder. This implies that
successfully challenging the $30 million patent yields revenue of $10
63

But see Sawicki, supra note 38, at 766 (citing Jonathan M. Barnett, Private
Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1251–52 (2004)) (noting that
the disincentive effects of mistaken invalidations depends on the efficacy of non-patent
mechanisms—such as trade secrets—that inventors can use to appropriate the social
surplus from their inventions).
64
This is not an atypical expenditure. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 52, at 187
(suggesting that $1 million is a low estimate of litigation costs); see also Josh Lerner,
Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J. L. & ECON. 463, 470–71 (1995) (reviewing
evidence that, while $3.7 billion was spent on basic research in 1991, $1 billion was spent
on direct litigation costs, and that indirect costs of patent litigation for public firms
averaged $20 million per case).
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million65 for the challenger and challenging the $60 million patent yields
the challenger $20 million. 66 If the challenger can only challenge one of
these patents, it will choose the higher valued patent. Thus the holder of the
higher value patent will face greater litigation risks than the holder of the
lower value patent.
Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that challengers target the
most valuable patents. For example, generic drug companies tend to
infringe on patents that protect markets with the highest sales revenues. 67
As a result, blockbuster drugs have experienced significant reductions in
their effective patent life in recent years. 68 Whereas the median loss to a
drug patent holder from a successful challenge is roughly $400 million, 69
the average loss to such a firm is roughly $1 billion in firm value. This
indicates a strong rightward skew in losses. We can think of no reason why
patterns of litigation would differ in other industries. 70
The result is that delegating challenges to private parties not only
reduces the share of social surplus that patent holders appropriate from their
innovation but also reduces that share disproportionately for the highest
value patents. In other words, the nature of private challenges is such that it
disincentivizes the most valuable innovations the most, directly
undermining the justification for employing the patent system over one that
employs government rewards.
65

30 × (2/3) × (1/2) = 10. The one-half is because we assume that the two firms split
any profits equally.
66
60 × (2/3) × (1/2) = 20.
67
C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and
Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 336 (2012); Laura E.
Panattoni, The Effect of Paragraph IV Decisions and Generic Entry Before Patent
Expiration on Brand Pharmaceutical Firms, 30 J. HEALTH ECON. 126 (2011).
68
Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity
Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL DECISION ECON. 491, 497 (2007). Although
Hemphill and Sampat, supra note 67, at 3–4, claim this is because blockbuster drugs use
lower quality patents to extend their patent life (so called “evergreening” strategies), their
argument fails to explain why Grabowski and Kyle find that the total market exclusivity
period for higher-sale new-molecular entities (NME) is lower, whether measured by mean
or median, than that for lower sale NMEs.
69
Indeed, this value is larger than the average cost of R&D up to the point of market
approval. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 154 fig. 1 (2003).
70
Indeed, challenging a patent may be easier in the drug industry than in other
industries because the Hatch–Waxman Act gives the first generic firm to file an ANDA
180 days of market exclusivity against other generic entry. See supra note 47.

20

3. Disproportionate Impacts on Smaller Firms
Challenges also disproportionately discourage innovations by smaller
firms. Commercially successful firms are not the only entities that obtain
and hold valuable patents, and thus they are not the only ones to become
targets when they innovate productively. Smaller firms—startup companies
and the like—also frequently see their valuable patents attacked, and
because the firms are less well-equipped to defend themselves the attacks
can be all the more pernicious.
These assaults take two typical forms. First, rather than license or
purchase valuable IP from smaller entities, large firms often simply attempt
to engineer around it. 71 For instance, imagine that Small Startup has
designed a valuable new semiconductor chip. It does not possess the
necessary manufacturing capability to actually produce the chip, but it
hopes to license the technology to a firm such as Intel. If Intel believes that
Small Startup’s patent is weak, or that Small Startup will not have the
resources to successfully prosecute a suit for patent infringement, Intel
could elect to engineer around the patent rather than licensing it. It could
simply begin manufacturing a very similar technology with only minor,
cosmetic alterations, gambling that it will be able to convince a court that it
has not infringed. The more that firms like Small Startup fear this outcome,
the less incentive they will have to innovate and enter markets occupied by
large incumbents in the first place.
This is not to say that all instances of engineering around a patent are
cases in which the patent holder is not receiving a fair return on its
invention; to the contrary, many patent holders deserve only narrow patents
that are relatively easy to design around. However, there are many instances
in which a small firm has in fact introduced a new and useful innovation
that a larger entity intends to copy. In these cases, a poorly drafted patent, or

71

John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 544 (2010).
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simply the application of significant litigation resources, 72 can allow the
larger firm to avoid paying for the technology it is borrowing. 73
This possibility is exacerbated by the resource differential between the
two entities. If the fair market value for a startup’s patent (or portfolio of
patents) is in the tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars, a larger firm
might think nothing of spending a few million dollars to defeat it or
engineer around it. 74 In theory, the startup should be able to use its patent to
obtain the capital necessary to defend the patent. In practice, however, that
is often impossible—capital constraints can make a battle with a larger firm
very difficult for a startup to win.75 And if a large company can pay its
engineers $3 million to find a way around a patent it would otherwise
license for $10 million, it will often do so. The patent is still worth
something—the large firm is paying millions to evade it—but the startup is
not capturing any of that value.
This is not to say that designing around a patent is always or necessarily
a bad thing. Ideally, patents would possess clear boundaries. 76 A great deal
of scholarship has been devoted to the virtues of narrow patents that do not
claim excessively broad inventive scopes. 77 The point is not that every
patent holder should be entitled to capture rents from a wide swath of
72

Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Law, 45
HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1227 (2008) (“Anticompetitive IP lawsuits may succeed because the
small firm defendant lacks the information to prove noninfringement or invalidity. Other
defendants may settle to avoid litigation costs even though they are confident the plaintiff
would lose the lawsuit.”).
73
Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1063, 1086 (2008) (“The rational would-be infringer, when confronted with a
patent held by an individual inventor or a small company with limited resources, would
likely be more willing to engage in infringing behavior, calculating that the risk of
enforcement is lower.”).
74
See Golden, supra note 71, at 544 (describing the incentives to design around
patents rather than license them).
75
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade
Secret Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
371, 405 (2002) (“Additionally, even if adequate funds exist to obtain patent protection
sufficient capital must exist to enforce patent rights against infringers<no space>. . . . This
enables accused infringers to aggressively exploit the limited funds available to a patent
owner.”).
76
Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 560 (2010).
77
See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent
Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1955
(2005) (arguing that broad patents may be used for anticompetitive behavior).
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following inventions. Rather, we have in mind situations in which a firm is
only trying to patent the invention it has already created, but its patent
leaves open the possibility that a competitor will find some way to
circumvent the intellectual property right. The competitor is still borrowing
the key idea—the “point of novelty” 78—but has managed to evade the
patent. When large firms adopt this approach in lieu of purchasing or
licensing the patent, it diminishes the incentives for startups to innovate in
the first instance.
The second type of assault on small firms with valuable patents is more
direct. In many cases, larger firms will threaten to sue small startups with
their own (large) patent portfolios as a means of forcing the startup to
license its IP on favorable terms. 79 Imagine two firms operating in the same
market: a large firm L and a small startup S. Suppose S invents and patents a
new, valuable device that will compete with L’s products. If L has a large
patent portfolio, it can threaten to sue S for infringement even if S’s new
device would not actually infringe L’s patents. The very threat of suit—not
to mention actual scorched-earth litigation—can be enough to hamper S’s
ability to attract investors and bring its product to market; venture capitalists
and banks will be wary of investing in a firm with the threat of litigation
hanging over its head. 80 Accordingly, L can force S to license its patent to L
on favorable terms in exchange for cross-licenses to L’s patents (which S
does not necessarily need). L then becomes S’s competitor, despite S’s
original patent. This practice has become known as “patent bullying,” 81 and
it can diminish the value of innovations made by small startups (to those
startups) if they do not have the resources or the patent portfolios to defend
themselves.
78

See Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Point of Novelty, 105 N.W. U. L. REV (2011).
See Graham & Sichelman, supra note 73, at 1068 (noting that “some companies use
patents to bully their competitors in order to drive up their costs, to gain access to their
technology, or to push them out of the market”).
80
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These two practices—engineering around and patent bullying—bend the
reward curve downward for small firms that successfully innovate. And as
with the mechanisms we described in section II.A.2, the more valuable a
firm’s innovation, the more pronounced this effect will be. More valuable
inventions are more valuable targets to competitors; larger firms will be
willing to invest greater resources in engineering around a valuable
innovation or threatening the startup that created it. Worse still, threats by
large competitors will scare away capital and commercial partners from
small firms, depriving them the resources they require to fight back on more
equal terms. The result will be a diminution of rewards to small firms for
successful innovation below the socially optimal level, and consequently a
reduction in these firms’ innovative efforts.
B. CHALLENGES AGAINST INVALID PATENTS

In some cases, challenges go too far, raising costs on valid patents and
discouraging innovation. In other cases, however, they do not go far
enough: the PTO grants an unnecessary or undeserved patent and a court
nonetheless upholds it. In such cases, an invalid patent continues to generate
significant economic costs without the compensating benefit of encouraging
innovation. The failure of private parties to challenge all invalid patents is
not a direct cost of challenges as much as a failure to fully accomplish the
institutional objective of challenges.
The reasons why patent challenges underperform mirror the reasons
why they sometimes go too far. Either private parties fail to challenge an
invalid patent or courts incorrectly uphold such patents when challenged.
Moreover, the failure of private parties can often be attributed to their
inclination to challenge only the most profitable patients, because they offer
larger rewards if successful, or the smallest patent holders, because they are
most easily defeated in court. We address these points in turn.
1. Insufficient Challenges and Validations
Just as private parties lack the complete information required to avoid
challenging valid patents, they also may lack the information required to
challenge all invalid patents. It is difficult, however, to quantify the extent
to which private parties fail to challenge invalid patents. In general, one
only observes challenges that are actually filed. Situations in which invalid
patents are not challenged are “censored” to scholars.
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The second and more important source of leakage with challenges is
that, even if an invalid patent is challenged, a court might mistakenly
validate it. As previously noted, scholars have criticized the Federal Circuit
for weak standards of patentability, courts in general for varying degrees of
fluency with patent cases, and judges for failing to learn from experience. 82
The 55% overall court-validation-rate provides some information on the
rate at which courts mistakenly validate invalid patents. It is likely that this
55% contains at least some truly valid patents; therefore, this is probably an
upper bound on the rate of incorrect validations by courts. In addition,
challengers might settle cases rather than litigating them fully, depriving the
public of the value of the patent challenge. And here, too, there is likely a
disproportionate impact on smaller firms, which are more likely to lack the
resources for scorched-earth litigation and thus more likely to settle earlier.
When an invalid patent is never challenged—or, worse, when it is
validated by a court—it imposes several types of costs on consumers and
other firms. First, if the patent is protecting a commercial good, those goods
will continue to be sold at monopoly prices, creating deadweight losses for
consumers who cannot afford them. 83 Second, when a court incorrectly
finds that an invalid patent is valid and infringed by another inventor, the
second (true) inventor must pay damages to the holder of the invalid patent.
This functions as a tax on genuine innovation, paid by true innovators to
holders of invalid property rights. The result will be a diminution of
incentives to innovate on account of this tax. And third, success with invalid
patents will cause firms to invest money in acquiring, asserting, and
litigating those patents. They will hire lawyers, demand licensing and
settlement fees, and litigate at substantial cost. 84 If the patents underlying
these activities are invalid and socially worthless, then licensing and
litigating them will generate no social value either—they represent pure
rent-seeking. The more that courts err and validate invalid patents, the more
that they will encourage the wasting of resources on these socially worthless
activities.
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2. Disproportionate Impacts
The tendency of patent challenges to target the most profitable patents
may exacerbate the cost of challenges when an underlying patent is truly
valid, but it is a positive attribute of challenges when the underlying patent
is truly invalid. The most profitable patents are the ones that generate the
most deadweight loss because monopoly and oligopoly pricing models
suggest that deadweight loss is proportional to monopoly or oligopoly
profits. 85 If the underlying patent is invalid, this larger deadweight loss is
not offset by a larger incentive to innovate, as it might be with valid
patents. 86 Thus, the tendency of challenges to seek out the more profitable
invalid patents implies that costly challenges are being appropriately
rationed to patents with the largest social cost.
The glass-half-empty view, however, is that the propensity to challenge
more profitable patents implies fewer challenges against less profitable
patents. Yet even less profitable invalid patents impose deadweight loss. It
would improve social welfare if there were more challenges and these
challenges targeted the less profitable patents, so long as the social costs
from those invalid patents are greater than the cost of litigation against
those patents. It is unlikely that all such challenges are occurring because
the gains to a private party from challenging such a patent may be less than
the deadweight loss from that patent. If the patent challenger wins,
competitors other than the challenger may enter the market, lowering profits
of the challenger below the level of the deadweight loss. It is this concern
that explains why, for example, the Hatch–Waxman Act grants the first
generic producer to challenge a drug patent 180 days of market exclusivity
(as against other generic producers) if the generic producer prevails in its
challenge. 87
Finally, a corollary of the claim that challengers focus on the valid
patents of smaller firms is that challengers tend to avoid challenges against
invalid patents held by large firms. These large firms can credibly threaten
85
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large litigation costs to discourage challengers and sustain invalid patents.
Large firms can often extract more rent from any given intellectual property
right than smaller firms because, for example, they have greater market
share and more information about consumers.
III. ENHANCED PATENT REMEDIES
In the preceding Parts, we described the manner in which patent
challenges can result in what amount to taxes on valuable innovation or
subsidies for the assertion of invalid patents. In particular, these taxes often
fall most heavily upon the innovations that are most valuable and on smaller
firms. We suggested that the inevitable result of such taxes and subsidies
will be to diminish incentives to innovate for the most productive inventors
and to encourage rent extraction by non-innovative firms.
Here, we offer a counterintuitive solution to this problem: raise the
stakes of patent lawsuits. Patent holders who manage to prevail against
challengers should receive enhanced rewards—heightened damages or
extensions of their patent terms—while patent holders who lose at trial
should be penalized for suing on the basis of invalid patents. This approach
might seem misguided on its face. If courts are liable to err in patent
lawsuits, the more appropriate response would seem to be to reduce the
impact of those lawsuits. Scholars have suggested such reforms, 88 and in
recent years courts appear to have taken steps in this direction. 89
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Yet as we will demonstrate below, increasing the stakes of patent
litigation can have tremendously beneficial effects on private firms’
incentives. Firms with valid, valuable patents will realize greater profits on
those patents, providing them with additional incentives to innovate and
correcting for the costs imposed by improper patent challenges. Firms with
invalid patents will face steep penalties if they lose at trial. Those penalties
will in turn dissuade them from filing suit in the first place and diminish
their ability to extract licensing and settlement fees. The result will be a
patent system that comes closer to rewarding genuine innovators but not the
holders of socially worthless property rights.
A. CANONICAL SOLUTIONS

The problems we have described in the preceding Parts all center around
judicial error. 90 In the face of such problems, commentators have typically
suggested the most straightforward solution: invest in accuracy. Proposals
for making courts more accurate abound. 91 However, there are welldocumented practical and theoretical impediments to this solution. Courts,
particularly courts staffed by generalist judges, will always struggle with
highly technical patent cases. 92 The judicial process and the limitations it
imposes upon gathering outside information and accessing expertise will
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also impede judicial accuracy. 93 This is not to say that there is no value to
investing in greater judicial accuracy; such investments may well be
worthwhile. But they are no panacea.
If there are limits to judicial accuracy, perhaps the government could
instead invest in accuracy at the Patent and Trademark Office. The patent
literature is rife with calls for improving accuracy at the PTO and
suggestions for achieving that goal. 94 However, even if this were possible, it
would not eliminate the costs involved with patent challenges. Holders of
valuable, valid patents might still bear costs as those patents were
challenged in court. The necessary second step would be to eliminate postgrant validity challenges entirely, whether in federal court, before the PTO,
or elsewhere. Once a patent had been issued by the PTO, it would be
considered per se valid and not subject to question in any future proceeding.
The elimination of post-grant challenges could be coupled with enhanced
review at the PTO, with additional resources devoted to screening out
invalid patents before they were ever issued. In theory, then, the costs of
patent challenges would be borne most heavily by parties with questionable
or invalid patents, not successful innovators.
Yet there are serious problems with this option. The first is that the
examination performed by the PTO may never be terribly efficient or
effective at weeding out bad patents because PTO examiners have
misaligned incentives. 95 As we explained above, they have no incentive to
conduct thorough searches of prior art and, even if they did, they would still
have greater incentives to grant, rather than reject, patent applications. 96
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Moreover, even if it were possible to correct these incentive problems, it
would be tremendously costly to conduct a thorough search of the prior art
on each and every patent filed each year. 97 There are simply too many
patent applications, and too many of them are economically insignificant
and will never be litigated or licensed. 98 As inefficient as patent challenges
may be, conducting a full-scale examination of every patent would be even
worse. Lastly, in many cases the owners of valuable patents are frustrated
not by rulings that their patents are invalid, but instead by rulings that they
are not infringed by important competitors. 99 Banning challenges to a
patent’s validity could hardly solve this problem, and there is no correlative
solution to the problems caused by non-infringement. Most importantly, if
the patent system is generally functioning correctly, it makes little sense to
entirely prohibit a set of challenges which will be welfare-enhancing more
often than not. Such a remedy is overbroad.
A more moderate alternative would be to imbue patents that have been
granted by the PTO with a heavy presumption of validity, diminishing the
number of incorrect invalidity determinations in the federal courts. Patents
are currently presumed valid when granted, and clear-and-convincing
evidence is required before they can be found invalid. 100 This presumption
might be strengthened further, to the point where (for instance) a patent
could only be invalidated if no reasonable person could find it valid. Some
scholars have suggested that the law should move in the opposite direction,
toward eliminating the presumption of validity on the basis of the PTO’s
manifest failings in patent examination, 101 but change now appears very
unlikely as the Supreme Court recently affirmed the existing standard. 102
Heightening the standard for invalidity would have many of the same
advantages and flaws as simply eliminating challenges entirely, though
those effects would be more muted. Absent any reason to believe that such
an intermediate solution would decrease the costs of eliminating validity
challenges more than it would the benefits, it strikes us as no more
advisable than a complete ban.
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B. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: ENHANCED REWARDS AND PENALTIES

The issue that we have identified is partly the result of erroneous
decisions to challenge or not to challenge a patent, and erroneous judicial
decisions to uphold an invalid patent or strike down a valid patent. If we
cannot easily reduce the probability that a valuable patent will be
erroneously defeated at trial, the second-best alternative might be to
increase the rewards to holders of valuable patents who prevail at trial. So
long as courts are more likely than not to uphold a valid patent, the effect
would be the same: to increase the valid patent holder’s net expected trial
outcome. Similarly, if we cannot easily reduce the probability that an
invalid patent will be erroneously validated at trial, the second-best
alternative might be to impose additional penalties against the holders of
patents who fail at trial. So long as courts are more likely than not to strike
down an invalid patent, this would reduce the invalid patent holder’s net
expected trial outcome.
We thus suggest raising the stakes in patent cases. Our basic idea is
simple. If a patent holder sues and wins, the court should award enhanced
damages above and beyond the normal measure of damages. If a patent
holder sues and loses, the court should assess a substantial monetary penalty
against the patent holder. This may seem counterintuitive—if patent
lawsuits are not perfectly accurate, it would seem to make little sense to
increase the costs involved in errors. Yet so long as courts are better than a
coin flip at identifying a patent as valid or invalid, a system of properly
designed, supplemental rewards and penalties could simultaneously (1)
eliminate the downward pressure on innovative incentives caused by errors
within the patent system; and (2) dissuade holders of bad patents from filing
suit in the first instance. Most importantly, such a system would tend to
benefit holders of valid, valuable patents, and diminish incentives to acquire
and assert invalid patents.
How would such a system function? Our idea is to apply standard
theories of compensation drawn from tort law. 103 Consider first holders of
valid, valuable patents. The purpose behind enhanced rewards is to
compensate those owners for the risk that their patents will be improperly
invalidated and thus counteract the downward bending of the reward curve
for the most valuable inventions. What is the cost of that risk? Suppose that
103
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a typical valid, valuable patent has a probability 𝑝 of being erroneously
invalidated (or erroneously found not infringed) in litigation. Suppose
further that litigation imposes a fixed cost of 𝑐 on the patent holder. The
cost of litigation to a patent holder is 𝑐 + 𝑝𝑣𝑦, where 𝑣 is the value of the
patent (to its owner) per year and 𝑦 is the number of useful years of patent
life lost to the patent owner. 104 The 𝑝𝑣𝑦 term represents the risk of early
invalidation. 105
The calculation for losing patent owners is quite similar. Suppose that
the owner of an invalid patent sues a genuine innovator for infringement.
Suppose the probability that the court errs and upholds an invalid patent is
𝑝, the same as the probability that the court strikes down an valid patent.106
The accused infringer will bear litigation costs of 𝑐. It will also face
expected damages of 𝑝𝑣𝑦. The potential cost to the innovator is therefore
𝑐 + 𝑝𝑣𝑦. As in tort law, the way to deter the holder of an invalid patent
from imposing such costs on blameless innovators is to force the losing
patent owner to internalize the costs of her own lawsuit, namely 𝑐 + 𝑝𝑣𝑦.
A problem that arises is that, just as a court cannot perfectly identify
whether a patent is valid or invalid, it cannot perfectly identify which
parties deserve compensation for exposure to litigation and those which
104
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should be penalized for imposing litigation risks. All courts know is
whether they upheld or struck down a patent. Therefore, any compensation
or penalties imposed after patent litigation must be conditioned on verdicts.
In doing so, the court must account for the fact that a patent that is upheld
may not be valid and a patent that is struck down may not be invalid. This
implies that the optimal compensation for a patent that has been upheld is
Pr{𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑|𝑈𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑} × (𝐸𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡)
+ Pr{𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑|𝑈𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑} × (𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡)

where 𝑃𝑟{𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑|𝑈𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑} is the probability that a patent is valid given that
it was upheld by the court, and 𝑃𝑟{𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑|𝑈𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑} is the probability that
a patent is actually invalid even though it was upheld by the court. That is,
the additional compensation provided to a winning patent holder must be
reduced to account for the probability that the court erred and the patent was
not actually valid. Similarly, the optimal penalty for a patent that has been
struck down at trial is
Pr{𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑|𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛} (𝐸𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡)
+ Pr{𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑|𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛} (𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡)

where 𝑃𝑟{𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑|𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛} is the probability that a patent is actually
valid even though it was struck down by the court, and
𝑃𝑟{𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑|𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛} is the probability that a patent is invalid given
that it was struck down by the court. As with enhanced rewards, because
judicial verdicts are imperfect, the penalty must be reduced to account for
the possibility that the court erred in striking it down.
To calculate the optimal transfers and penalties, we need to estimate
how informative court judgments are. To do this, we can use Bayes’s
Theorem:
Pr{𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑|𝑈𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑} =

Pr{𝑈𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑|𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} × Pr{𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑}
(Pr{𝑈𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑|𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} × Pr{𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} +
Pr{𝑈𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑|𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} × Pr{𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑})

where 𝑃𝑟{𝑈𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑|𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} is the probability that a patent will be upheld
given that it is valid, which is equal to 1 − 𝑝; 𝑃𝑟{𝑈𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑|𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} is the
probability that a patent will be upheld given that it is invalid; and
𝑃𝑟{𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} and 𝑃𝑟{𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} are the probabilities that a patent selected at
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random will be valid or invalid, respectively. If we assume that
𝑃𝑟{𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} = 𝑃𝑟{𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑}, 107 then Bayes’s Rule suggests that
Pr{𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑|𝑈𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑} simplifies to (1 − 𝑝)/(1 − 𝑝 + 𝑝) = 1 − 𝑝. Because a
patent must either be valid or invalid, this also implies that
Pr{𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑|𝑈𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑} = 𝑝. Using the same approach, we can estimate the
probabilities that a patent is valid or invalid if it is struck down. By Bayes’s
Rule,
Pr{𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑|𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛} =

Pr{𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛|𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} × Pr{𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑}
(Pr{𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛|𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} × Pr{𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑}
+ Pr{𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛|𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} × Pr{𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑})

where 𝑃𝑟{𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛|𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} is the probability that a patent will be
struck down given that it is invalid, which is equal to 1– 𝑝;
𝑃𝑟{𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛|𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} is the probability that a patent will be struck
down given that it is valid, which is equal to p; and 𝑃𝑟{𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} and
𝑃𝑟{𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} are the probabilities that a patent selected at random will be
valid or invalid, respectively. As before, if we assume that 𝑃𝑟{𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} =
𝑃𝑟{𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑}, Pr{𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑|𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛} simplifies to (1 − 𝑝)/(1 − 𝑝 +
𝑝) = 1 − 𝑝. Again by negative implication, Pr{𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑|𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛} = 𝑝.
If we plug these values into the equations for optimal compensation, we
will find that the optimal reward for a patent upheld at trial is
(1 − 𝑝)(𝑐 + 𝑝𝑣𝑦) + 𝑝(−𝑐 − 𝑝𝑣𝑦) = (1 − 2𝑝)(𝑐 + 𝑝𝑣𝑦).

Likewise, the optimal penalty for a patent struck down at trial is

𝑝(𝑐 + 𝑝𝑣𝑦) + (1 − 𝑝)(−𝑐 − 𝑝𝑣𝑦) = −(1 − 2𝑝)(𝑐 + 𝑝𝑣𝑦).

The (1 − 2𝑝) discount reflects the lack of confidence that court verdicts
identify truly valid and invalid patents.
In order for this system of enhanced rewards and penalties to have the
desired incentive effects, patent holders and challengers must of course
107

This is equivalent to assuming that 50% of patents asserted in litigation are invalid
or not infringed. This may overstate the true percentage of asserted patents that are valid
and infringed. See supra note 52. Regardless, we set 𝑃𝑟{𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} = 𝑃𝑟{𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑} only to
simplify the mathematics here. The formula will generate correct answers so long as the
true values are plugged in.
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have some sense of whether the patent at issue is valid and infringed or not.
If the parties are entirely mistaken as to the validity of the patent, enhanced
rewards and penalties will only skew their behavior even further. However,
as we will demonstrate at the end of this section, very little accuracy is
actually required of patent holders and challengers. So long as litigants are
better than a coin flip at determining what sort of patent is involved, the
system of enhanced rewards and penalties will improve litigation
incentives.
In order to illustrate the effects of these enhanced rewards and penalties,
consider a simple numerical example. Suppose that the typical patent
litigation costs $10 million, and the error rate in the typical case is 20%. (It
will of course be impossible to determine the error rate in a particular
case—doing so would be tantamount to determining the outcome with
perfect certainty. Courts will necessarily rely instead upon the typical error
rate across cases.) 108 Suppose further that pharmaceutical Firm A holds a
patent that is worth $10 million per year and has seven years of patent life
remaining. That patent is being infringed by generic drug Firm B. Firm A
stands to collect $70 million (the value of damages and an injunction) from
Firm B if it prevails at trial. 109 Under current rules, if Firm A were to
prevail, its gain would be:
$70 million in damages – $10 million in litigation costs = $60
million.

If Firm A were defeated, it would pay:

$10 million in litigation costs.

Under our proposed system of enhanced rewards and benefits, if Firm A
prevailed, it would collect:
108

We discuss in detail below the issues of how this error rate might be calculated and
what actor or institution might be best equipped and positioned to calculate it.
109
It will not necessarily always be the case that the value of the patent to its owner is
equivalent to the damages that will be assessed against the defendant in the event that the
patent owner prevails at trial. It will depend upon a number of factors, including the effect
that the entrance of the infringer into the market will have on the patent holder’s supercompetitive profits. Yet the exact numbers are irrelevant. The system of enhanced rewards
and penalties we describe will function similarly irrespective of the precise numerical
values involved. We employ similar numbers here only to simplify the mathematics.
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$70 million in damages – $10 million in litigation costs +
($10 million + $70 million × 0.2) × (1 – 0.4) in enhanced
rewards = $74.4 million.

If Firm A lost at trial, it would be forced to pay:

$10 million in litigation costs + ($10 million + $70
million × 0.2) × (1 – 0.4 in penalties= $24.4 million.

Now consider the effects that these enhanced rewards and penalties will
have upon litigant behavior. Imagine that Firm A has a valid, valuable
patent, one based upon legitimate research and covering a socially valuable
invention. Suppose that Firm A has a 75% chance of prevailing against Firm
B at trial. Under current law, Firm A’s expected payoff from litigating is:
($60 million net × 0.75) – ($10 million × 0.25) = $42.5
million.

With enhanced rewards and penalties, Firm A’s expected payoff is:
($74.4 million net × 0.75) – ($24.4 million × 0.25) =
$49.7 million.

As is evident from the calculations above, the enhanced rewards that Firm A
receives when it succeeds at trial more than balance out the penalties it
would be forced to pay if it fails. This is because Firm A has a strong patent,
one that is more likely than not to be found valid and infringed. The result is
that Firm A will be almost fully compensated for the risk it runs that its
patent will be found invalid each time it is forced to litigate. Firm A’s
reward curve will be bent back upward, and its incentives to pursue the
most socially valuable inventions will be largely restored.
Suppose that Firm A instead owns a worthless, invalid patent, one that it
should not be asserting against genuine innovators. Nonetheless, because of
the possibility of judicial error, there is a 20% chance that Firm A’s patent
will be found valid and infringed at trial. Under current law, Firm A’s
expected payoff from litigating is:
($60 million net × 0.2) – ($10 million × 0.8) = $4 million.
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With enhanced rewards and penalties, Firm A’s expected payoff from
litigating is:
($74.4 million × 0.2) – ($24.4 million × 0.8) = – $4.64
million.
The addition of enhanced rewards and penalties thus transforms Firm
A’s decision to litigate this weak patent from a reasonable gamble with a
positive payoff into a losing proposition. 110 This will have feedback effects
on Firm A’s other uses of the patent. Firm A will not be able to extract
substantial concessions during licensing negotiations or settlement if it
stands to lose money if it proceeds to trial. This is exactly as it should be:
we are better off if this patent is never so much as mentioned in a
threatening letter, much less asserted at trial.
The analytic discussion that began this section set forth the optimal
measure of enhanced rewards and penalties. And the numerical example
that followed was of course just one example. But it is crucial to note that
enhanced rewards and penalties will improve trial outcomes for owners of
valuable patents and harm trial outcomes for owners of invalid patents any
time that courts and litigants are more accurate than flipping coins. That is,
if courts reach the right outcome at trial more than 50% of the time, and
litigants know whether they have a valid or invalid patent with at least 50%
accuracy, and the enhanced reward or penalty is greater than zero, then the
system we describe will benefit holders of valid patents and harm holders of
invalid ones. 111 It is not necessary that private parties have any
informational advantages over courts (though it would be helpful). Nor is it
necessary that the two parties have asymmetric (or symmetric) beliefs or
If the probability of error is larger, for example, 𝑝 = 0.25, then it is possible that a
patent holder should receive a reward even if its patent is struck down. The reason is that
the ideal reward for a valid patent holder is much larger than the ideal penalty on an invalid
patent holder. Even a slight increase in the error rate increases the probability that a verdict
striking down a patent is ensnaring a valid patent holder and thus increases the proper
transfer, perhaps making it net positive.
111
If courts are less than 50% accurate—that is, worse than a coin flip—then it makes
no sense to have courts deciding patent cases in the first place. If the courts cannot be
improved, we would be better off abolishing them and flipping coins. We cannot prove
that courts are better than a coin flip, but we suspect (or at least hope) that this is the case.
110
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information. The mechanism of enhanced rewards and penalties will
function properly so long as each actor is more accurate than a coin flip. It
is thus robust to an extremely wide range of parameters.
To illustrate this point, consider the following extreme numerical
example. Suppose courts are 51% accurate at determining whether a patent
is valid or invalid; parties are similarly 51% accurate at determining the
validity of the patent at suit; and enhanced rewards and penalties are set at
$1,000. The holder of a valid patent will likely receive an enhanced trial
award of:
$1000 × 0.51 – $1000 × 0.49 = $20.

The holder of an invalid patent will likely be assessed a penalty of:
$1000 × 0.51 – $1000 × 0.49 = $20.

Suppose that a patent owner owns a valid and valuable patent but only
knows this with 51% probability. The patent owner will anticipate an
enhanced payoff of:
$20 × 0.51 – $20 × 0.49 = $0.40.

In symmetric fashion, an owner of an invalid patent would anticipate an
enhanced penalty of –$0.40. The high degree of inaccuracy depresses the
impact of the enhanced rewards and penalties. But the principle nonetheless
holds: firms with valuable patents will be compensated in part for their
litigation risk, while firms with valueless patents will be punished for
threatening suit.
By consequence, firms with valid, valuable patents will be even more
likely to file suit; firms with invalid, socially worthless patents will be less
likely to file suit or assert those patents against genuine innovators. Most
importantly, this mechanism will function without any gains in accuracy by
the courts or the PTO. Private parties will adjust simply as a matter of their
own incentives and their perceived likelihood of success. The result will be
fewer lawsuits based upon invalid patents and greater rewards for owners of
valid, valuable intellectual property rights.
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C. WHO PAYS WHOM?

The discussion thus far has been directed toward properly setting the
patent holder’s incentives. The goal is to reward holders of valuable patents
in order to incentivize further research and development, while
simultaneously dissuading owners of worthless patents from filing suit. We
have not yet addressed the question of who should pay for patent owners’
enhanced rewards and who should be paid when patent owners are assessed
enhanced penalties. We take up those questions in this section, and again
we reach a counterintuitive conclusion: the structure of payments should not
be symmetric. Successful patent challengers should be paid by the patent
holders who litigated against them; but victorious patent holders should be
paid by the public, rather than the patent challenger who has been found to
infringe. This is contrary to the norm in American civil litigation that, aside
from the costs of litigation, damages paid by the defendant are equal to the
damages received by the plaintiff. 112
1. Victorious Patent Owner
When a patent owner in possession of a valuable property right prevails
at trial, it would seem obvious at first blush that the patent challenger
should be forced to pay for the enhanced rewards. After all, it is the
challenger who has created the costs in the first instance. However, this
might inhibit valuable challenges to bad patents as well—a losing infringer
could face very substantial liability under this rule. Challengers to bad
patents are providing public goods: if they invalidate a socially harmful
property right, a broad spectrum of innovators will reap the benefits. 113
When a court invalidates a patent, it benefits the consumers of the
underlying product as well as all competing firms that might wish to enter
112

See Robert D. Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of
Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1985). Criminal penalties are an exception.
Defendants pay fines to the state rather than to the victim of their crimes. See, e.g., Andrew
M. Kenefick, Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 Mich. L. Re. 1699, 1704 (1987).
113
Public goods are goods that are non-rival, in that no one can be excluded from
using or enjoying them. The invalidation of a bad patent creates a public good in that any
competitor to the patent holder, not just the party that invalidated the patent, can now enter
the market. For a general discussion of public goods, see HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC
FINANCE 61 (5th ed. 1999).
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the relevant market—not just the firm that prevailed in the lawsuit. 114 As a
result, a patent challenger only internalizes a small fraction of the benefits
of a successful suit. There will be many instances in which it would be
socially productive if a patent were challenged but not privately worthwhile
for any individual firm, and the challenge will not take place. 115 For
instance, suppose that a semiconductor manufacturer holds a patent on a
valuable computer chip. The patent, however, is plausibly invalid—the chip
is too similar to one that preceded it. It would be socially productive if
another semiconductor firm were to challenge the patent and attempt to
invalidate it because the price of the chip would fall if the challenge were
successful. But it might not be worthwhile for another manufacturer to do
so. That firm would bear the full cost of the challenge, including the
damages it would have to pay if it were found to be infringing. But it would
capture only a fraction of the value of invalidating the patent. The original
manufacturer would still control part of the market, and other
semiconductor firms that did not participate in the lawsuit could swoop in
and capture market share as well. The challenger would be largely
providing a benefit to other parties. This is why there are likely too few
patent challenges over all. It makes little sense to impose additional taxes on
patent challengers and potentially further dissuade them from producing
such public goods.
Another possibility is paying for the additional rewards out of general
tax revenues. The government could provide a direct monetary award as
part of the remedies phase of the litigation. This would avoid distortions in
the behavior of potential patent challengers. However, we think a superior
solution would be for future consumers of the innovative firm’s products to
pay for these rewards. The reason is fairness—or at least distributional
neutrality. The reason for creating supplemental rewards is to eliminate the
disincentive for future innovation imposed by non-meritorious litigation.
The beneficiaries of this future innovation are the future consumers of the
firm’s products. Thus, it is more fair—and there is less needless
114

See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for
Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 688 (2004) (“A court judgment that a
patent claim is invalid is a public good.”).
115
See Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid
Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 114 (2006) (“[E]ven invalid patents can create
unacceptable litigation risks for potential entrants, raise entry costs, delay entry, deter
customers and business partners from contracting with new entrants, and impose
inefficiencies while distorting innovation.”).
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redistribution of wealth—if future consumers pay for these supplemental
rewards.
The more difficult question is how to identify and collect from these
future consumers. It is, of course, impossible to know precisely who will
purchase a firm’s products in the future. But the firm’s current consumers
(or those people who will be purchasers in the near future) might serve as a
reasonable proxy. Individuals who are purchasing Apple products today are
probably most likely to purchase them in the future; individuals (or
businesses) who buy one Dell computer are more likely to purchase another
Dell computer; and so forth. 116 The government could conceivably impose a
special tax on current or future purchases of a firm’s products, with that tax
being paid directly to the firm. But this would be counterproductive. It
would amount to a state-imposed price hike on a firm’s goods, which would
presumably decrease the quantities of those goods sold. It is safe to assume
that each firm is pricing its own goods so as to maximize profits—or, at
least, that the firm is better at doing so than the government would be. 117
Most firms would simply lower their prices, returning the overall price of
the product to its prior level. A separate tax, even one paid directly to the
firm, would not be an improvement.
A better solution is to extend the terms of the patents at suit.118 Consider
a change in the law that allowed courts to award additional years at the end
of a patent term any time a patent holder won a lawsuit for infringement of
that patent. The firm would garner further monopoly profits from this
extended term, providing additional rewards for its innovation. These
rewards would be paid for by consumers who purchase that firm’s products
in the near future—again, a reasonable proxy for those consumers who will
purchase future products made by the same firm. 119

116

Cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1462–63 (2002) (arguing that patents and
trademarks can be used to increase the power of brand loyalty and its profitability).
117
See, e.g., Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer
Finance, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 168, 179 (2002) (explaining that the common effects of
price controls are “queuing, unsatisfied demand, and an illegal market . . . .”).
118
A patent is valid for twenty years from the date the patent application was first
filed. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
119
Of course, if the victorious patent holder is not a commercial firm but instead a
non-practicing entity that makes profits through patent royalties, it would be the losing
firm’s customers, rather than the winning firm’s customers, who would foot the bill. If the
patent was truly novel and innovative and was effectively expropriated by the defendant,

41

It would not be difficult for a court (or Congress) to properly price the
size of this supplemental reward. Recall that the supplemental reward
should equal (𝑐 + 𝑝𝑣𝑦)/(1– 2𝑝). The 𝑝𝑣𝑦 term represents the potential
loss of patent term length if that patent is improperly invalidated at trial. If
the value of a patent over its lifespan is approximately constant, a court
should just extend a patent’s term by (𝑐/𝑣 + 𝑝𝑦)(1– 2𝑝)—the ratio of
transaction costs to the annual value of the patent, plus the number of
valuable years of the patent term put at risk at trial discounted by the
probability that the patent could have been mistakenly invalidated. If
litigation costs are small relative to annual profits from a patent—that is, if
𝑐 ≪ 𝑣—one could ignore the 𝑐/𝑣 term. 120 This would eliminate any need to
calculate precisely the average yearly value of the patent, which a court
would have to undertake if it were awarding supplemental monetary
damages. The fact that it is the patent itself that is being extended renders
this accounting unnecessary. Imagine, for instance, that a patent holder wins
an infringement lawsuit based on conduct that began fourteen years after the
patent at suit was granted. Six years remain on the patent term. Suppose that
the court estimates that the error rate in such cases involving valid patents is
20%. 121 In addition to the usual remedies, the court would extend the
patent’s term by an additional 0.84 years, or approximately 10 months. 122
There could also be a small additional adjustment (𝑐/𝑣) for the fixed cost 𝑐
of the patent litigation even if 𝑐 ≪ 𝑣. 123
The potential downside of extending the patent term—as opposed to
simply paying the patentee from general tax revenues—is that it could lead
to increased deadweight economic losses. As we explained above, the virtue
this arrangement would be appropriate. But if the patent is not novel and valuable, it
presents a problem. Section IV offers a brief sketch of a solution.
120
For evidence that suggests litigation costs are often substantially lower than annual
profits, see infra text accompanying note 64.
121
It may be substantially overoptimistic to think that a court could properly estimate
the probability of its own (or the jury’s) error. Accordingly, it would probably be best if
Congress set this probability by legislation.
122
(20 year patent term – 14 years elapsed) × 0.2 × (1 – 0.4) = 0.84 years = 10.08
months.
123
Calculation of this additional adjustment will necessarily be more crude, as the
variance in patent values—and thus the variance in the value of additional term length—far
exceeds the variance in the cost of patent litigation. Some victorious patent holders will
inevitably be paid too much; some will be paid too little. However, in many cases, and for
many valuable patents—the ones that will be litigated most frequently—𝑐 will be much
smaller than v. Accordingly, it will be unnecessary to calculate this additional quantity.
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of a patent is that it provides the patentee with a limited monopoly over a
good, allowing the patentee to charge monopolistic prices (rather than
competitive prices). These higher prices incentivize further research and
innovation, but they are also conventionally thought to price some
consumers out of the market. When a consumer who would have purchased
the good at a competitive price cannot afford it at its monopoly price, there
is a resulting deadweight loss in the form of diminished consumer
welfare. 124
This is an important consideration, though it may well be outweighed by
the other advantages of extending the patent term. The main case for a
twenty-year patent is that the innovative effects from exclusivity of that
duration exceeds the deadweight loss from that exclusivity. That argument
is typically made while ignoring the litigation costs from patent challenges
and assuming no court errors when challenges are litigated. Our patent
extension and penalties are designed to return the period of exclusivity to
the balance that would be achieved under a twenty-year patent without
challenges. Moreover, it is possible that the conventional belief that patents
lead to monopoly prices and deadweight losses is overstated. In separate
work, we have argued that creative pricing mechanisms can eliminate the
deadweight loss associated with patents by ensuring that no (or very few)
consumers are priced out of the market for patented goods. 125 We further
demonstrate that these pricing mechanisms are in use across a broad
spectrum of industries. 126 If we are correct, the case against patent term
extensions dissipates substantially.
A second concern with our approach is that it relies upon a questionable
assumption: that the value of a patent is approximately constant over time.
If a patent declines in value over time, additional years after the end of the
typical patent term will be insufficient to compensate the patent holder for
the risk of losing earlier years before the end of the patent’s life. In the
limiting case, a patent may even be worthless by the end of its life. This
assumption of constant patent value is fairly conservative for
pharmaceuticals and for many types of medical devices, which sell for a
higher price and at higher quantities at the end of their life than they do at
124

See Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should
Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 662 (2010).
125
See Anup Malani & Jonathan Masur, Two-Part Pricing and the Cost of Patents
(2012) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
126
Id.
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the beginning 127 due to advertising. 128 But it does not hold true for most
semiconductor and computer patents, which are generally valueless after
four or five years as they are outpaced by advances in technology. 129
Accordingly, in designing supplemental remedies it might be necessary to
draw distinctions among industries. Owners of pharmaceutical patents
would receive an additional patent-term length, while owners of computerrelated patents would receive direct monetary payments from the
government. We do not pause to dwell on the specifics of this proposal here
but instead explore the idea of industry-specific treatment in greater detail
in Part IV. In addition, in that Part we suggest modifications to the proposal
for supplemental remedies that may obviate the particular issue of whether
to grant additional term length or supplemental money damages.
2. Victorious Patent Challenger
As we explained above, there will generally be too few patent
challenges because patent challengers cannot fully internalize the benefits
of their success. In order to incentivize greater numbers of patent
challenges, it makes sense to offer additional rewards or bounties to patent
challengers who succeed in court. Accordingly, when a patent challenger
prevails and forces a patent owner to pay heightened penalties, those
penalties should be paid to the patent challenger. The Hatch–Waxman Act
accomplishes this in the context of pharmaceutical patents by offering
successful patent challengers 180 days of market exclusivity. 130 In effect,
we are suggesting a Hatch–Waxman-type rule for every type of patent.
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Jayanta Bhattacharya & William B. Vogt, A Simple Model of Pharmaceutical Price
Dynamics, 46 J.L & ECON. 599 (2003); Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Generic
Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 75, 86 (1997);
Henry. G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price Competition in
Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L & ECON. 331 (1992).
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Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, Does Intellectual Property Restrict Output?
An Analysis of Pharmaceutical Markets, 55 J.L & ECON. 151 (2012).
129
See Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for
Technology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms, 50 MGMT. SCI. 804, 808 (2004)
(describing the life cycle of high-tech patents).
130
See Hemphill, supra note 47, at 1561–67 (2006) (describing in detail the operation
of the Hatch–Waxman Act). The Hatch–Waxman Act has several design flaws that make it
subject to substantial abuse, see id. at 1571–72, but those flaws do not affect the system of
enhanced penalties described here.

44

In addition to the positive incentive effects, forcing defeated patent
owners to pay enhanced penalties to victorious challengers would have
valuable distributional effects. When a patent owner asserts an invalid
patent, it is the competitor—the patent challenger—who stands to be
harmed most directly. The invalid patent functions as a mechanism for
taxing the genuine innovation in which the competitor has engaged. This in
turn harms consumers of the patent challenger’s products, who are forced to
pay higher prices because of this tax. The enhanced penalties paid to patent
challengers would compensate them, in the aggregate, for the risk that they
will be unfairly taxed at trial. As the costs of innovation decrease, so too
will the prices of patent challengers’ goods. The end beneficiaries will be
the consumers who have been shouldering the costs of unmeritorious
litigation all along.
D. RELATED APPROACHES

1. The English Rule
The solution we offer above bears a family resemblance to a more
pedigreed legal mechanism: the “loser pays” or “English Rule.” In
jurisdictions that have adopted the English Rule, the losing party in
litigation must pay the prevailing party’s costs and attorneys’ fees. 131 If
courts and juries in patent cases are accurate most of the time, then applying
the English Rule should be generally beneficial: holders of strong patents
would see their rewards increase, and holders of weak patents would see
theirs diminish. Yet we do not believe that it would be appropriate to
straightforwardly apply the English Rule in patent cases.
There is an extensive literature on the advantages and disadvantages of
the English Rule, in comparison to the standard American Rule in which
both sides bear their own costs, 132 and we will not recapitulate that literature
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Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651 (1982) (“The English routinely include an assessment for a
reasonable attorney’s fee in the costs to be borne by a losing party . . . .”).
132
Id. (“With its general rule that each side in civil litigation has ultimate
responsibility for its own lawyer’s fees and that the system will not require the loser to pay
anything toward the winner’s representation, this country stands in a small minority among
the industrialized democracies.”).
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here. 133 It suffices to note three particular reasons why we do not believe
that the English Rule is advisable or adequate. First, it is well understood
that the English Rule can cause distortions in litigation behavior by
encouraging litigants to increase their litigation expenditures, figuring that
their opponents will eventually have to pay. 134 The greater the differential in
resources between the two sides, the greater the distortions: a wealthy
litigant can threaten to effectively bankrupt a poorer opponent in the event
of victory. 135 This is especially important in the context of patent disputes
between small start-up companies and large commercial firms, which we
described in Part II above. There, the problem is that litigation costs are
relatively minor for the large commercial entity but enormous for the much
smaller firm, impinging on the smaller firm’s ability to effectively defend
its patents. Forcing the smaller firm to account for the risk of bearing the
larger firm’s costs would only exacerbate this problem.
One partial solution might be to institute an “infringer-pays” rule, rather
than the neutral English Rule. Under such a rule, a defendant held liable for
infringement would pay the plaintiff’s costs and fees, but a defeated
plaintiff would not be responsible for the defendant’s fees. 136 This would
shield plaintiff start-up companies from huge losses in the event that they
were defeated by larger competitors. However, it would not solve the
133
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correlative problem of larger firms using their extensive portfolios to
threaten smaller competitors who possess valuable patents. 137 If those
threats became litigation, the smaller firms would still be at risk of financial
ruin in the event that they lost. Of course, a finding that the small firm had
infringed the larger firm’s patents might have exactly the same effect,
making the addition of attorneys’ fees irrelevant. Accordingly, an infringerpays rule might be preferable. 138
Yet this in turn raises the second problem with the English Rule, which
is that it could unreasonably diminish incentives to bring patent challenges,
including worthwhile challenges to invalid patents. 139 As we explained
above, worthwhile patent challenges produce public goods. 140
Consequently, there are generally fewer patent challenges than would be
optimal. The English Rule would exacerbate this problem by increasing the
penalties for unsuccessful patent challenges, further dissuading potential
challengers from litigating. It is for this reason that we advocate paying
successful patent owners through patent extensions, rather than forcing
patent challengers to shoulder the cost. One could imagine instead
instituting a “plaintiff pays” rule, in which only unsuccessful patent
plaintiffs must shoulder the other side’s costs. But this would merely return
to the problems described in the paragraphs above.
It is additionally worth noting that at the time of this writing, a bill has
been introduced in the House of Representatives that would establish a
similarly asymmetric fee-shifting rule. The “Shield Act” would allow courts
to order patent plaintiffs to pay alleged infringers’ attorneys’ fees—“upon
making a determination that the party alleging the infringement of the
patent did not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding.” 141 The bill is
incomplete and flawed as currently written. It would do nothing to
137

See supra sections II.A.3 & II.B.2.
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compensate holders of valuable patents for the risk that their patents might
be erroneously overturned, and in fact it would only reduce the value of
those patents further. But it nonetheless represents a promising step in the
right direction.
None of these formulations of the fee-shifting rule eliminates the third
shortcoming of that approach, which is that litigation costs constitute an
extremely small fraction of the potential lost value of a patent in the event
of an erroneous judicial decision. Holders of valuable patents face two sorts
of costs when they become targets: litigation costs and costs associated with
the possibility that a patent will be mistakenly held invalid (or not
infringed). The former cost is not insignificant, but it can be dwarfed by the
latter. The average patent case that is litigated to final judgment costs each
side on the order of $5 million.142 Yet a single patent—particularly a patent
on a successful pharmaceutical—could be worth hundreds of millions or
even billions of dollars per year. Consider a patent valued at $500 million
that is 10% likely to be invalidated at trial. Each time that patent’s owner
goes to trial, the litigation costs represent less than 10% of the total
expected loss that litigation presents. 143 The English Rule, standing alone, is
thus far from a full solution.
2. Insurance Claims and Fraud
To the best of our knowledge there is no legal system that formally
replicates the structure of enhanced rewards and penalties that we have
described here. However, a rough facsimile has developed in the field of
insurance law. 144 If an insurance claimant files a fraudulent claim, she runs
the risk of not only having that claim denied but in addition facing criminal
penalties for insurance fraud. 145 On the other hand, if an insurance claimant
files a valid claim and the insurer unreasonably or fraudulently denies the
claim, the claimant can in some cases collect punitive damages from the
insurance company. 146 Insurance law thus functions as a two-sided system
142
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of enhanced rewards and penalties, at least in extreme cases. We can think
of the insurance claimant as standing in the shoes of the patent holder, and
the insurance company in the role of the alleged infringer.
There is a potential concern that the possibility of enhanced rewards—
punitive damages for fraudulent denial of an insurance claim—could lead
insured parties to sandbag their insurers. The insured would withhold key
information in an attempt to induce the insurer to deny the claim, and then
deploy that information in order to convince a court that the insurer’s
actions had been fraudulent. A system of enhanced rewards and penalties
could conceivably become counterproductive if such behavior migrated to
patent law.
To the extent that this concern even exists in insurance law, 147 we do not
believe that it would be present in patent law. The premise behind such
chicanery is that insured parties possess private information about their
claims or themselves. It is this private information that they are able to first
withhold and then deploy. But patentees possess no such private
information: the patent, its prosecution history, and all relevant prior art are
all public. There is nothing for the patentee to withhold, and thus no
opportunity for such strategic behavior. 148
*

*

*

If verdicts in patent cases tend to be inaccurate, it would seem
misguided to suggest raising the stakes of those cases. But that is precisely
what we propose here. Providing enhanced rewards for patent owners who
succeed at trial and enhanced penalties for owners who fail would force
owners of valid and invalid patents to self-sort. Owners of valid, valuable
147

Insurance law has mechanisms to deal with this type of problem, such as the fact
that the cause of action requires that the insurer have acted in bad faith.
To show a claim for bad faith, a plaintiff must show the absence of a
reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy and the defendant’s
knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for
denying the claim. It is apparent, then, that the tort of bad faith is an
intentional one.
Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (1978).
148
Of course, the patentee could refrain from publicizing the very existence of the
patent. But this is precisely what patentees are already doing. See Clarisa Long,
Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 471 (2004).

49

patents would realize greater rewards from asserting those patents, and thus
greater incentives to innovate in the first instance. Owners of invalid patents
would have substantially less to gain at trial, and thus less ability to extract
rents from genuine innovators. Such a system of heightened rewards and
penalties would have substantial salutary effects, even if courts never
became more accurate.
IV. REFINEMENTS AND CAVEATS
So far we have laid out the basic theory behind our proposal for raising
the stakes in patent cases. As we have explained, policymakers need not
estimate courts’ error rates precisely or calculate reward and penalty
multipliers perfectly for our proposal to improve the patent system. All that
is necessary is (1) that courts and parties are more than 50% accurate—that
is, better than a coin flip; and (2) that the supplemental penalties and
rewards are greater than zero. So long as these two conditions are met, any
implementation would represent an improvement from the status quo.
But policymakers could in fact do much better if they so chose. In the
sections that follow, we highlight a number of refinements that would
enhance the effectiveness of our proposal in substantial ways. We also
address a number of potential problems with such a system and provide
workable solutions. First, we describe how policymakers could tailor a
system of enhanced rewards and benefits to particular inventive industries,
applying enhanced rewards in industries where patents are generally
valuable and the risk of erroneous invalidation is highest, and enhanced
penalties in industries characterized by excessive patenting and patent
holdup. We then discuss how our proposal might be implemented, and by
which institutional actors. We analyze the effects of enhanced rewards and
penalties on settlement behavior. And we close by addressing the problems
that arise if patent plaintiffs are judgment-proof.
A. INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC TREATMENT

The system of enhanced rewards and penalties that we propose will
effectively separate holders of valid and invalid patents by adjusting their
incentives at trial. But it might be possible to increase the specificity and
precision of this system by applying it piecemeal. Certain types of lawsuits
would be eligible for enhanced rewards but not penalties; other types of
lawsuits could be opened to enhanced penalties but not rewards.
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For instance, consider the role of non-practicing entities (NPEs). These
are firms that do not actually produce or market any product or service, and
often do no research, either. Instead, they simply own patents and use those
patents to secure licensing fees or litigation judgments against productive
commercial firms. It might be possible to take advantage of the fact that
NPEs file a disproportionate share of the lawsuits in which invalid patents
are asserted. 149 That is to say, a lawsuit brought by an NPE is more likely to
involve an overbroad or invalid patent, or one that contributed no useful
innovation, than a lawsuit brought by a commercial firm. If the goal is to
avoid benefitting holders of these sorts of patents, NPEs should be
separated from other types of patent plaintiffs.
The most direct method for accomplishing this would be to not award
enhanced rewards to any patent plaintiff that has not produced a product in
the technological area covered by its patent in suit. One could even imagine
very particular tests, such as: plaintiffs will not be eligible for enhanced
remedies unless they have made $X million in sales of a product covered by
the patent at suit.
There are a number of problems with this approach. The first is that it
would disadvantage small start-up companies and other firms that might
eventually become commercial entities but have not yet produced products.
(It also might be seen as an invitation to infringe patents that have simply
not yet been commercialized.) However, this will be an issue with any
sorting mechanism based around whether or not a firm is an NPE. A firm’s
NPE status is not a perfect proxy for the true variable of interest—whether
the firm is asserting an invalid or overbroad patent. Using it as a proxy will
inevitably lead to errors of over-inclusion (start-up firms) and underinclusion (commercial firms asserting invalid patents).
The larger flaw with this sorting mechanism is that it would incentivize
firms to evade it by simply transferring their patents to other companies.
Consider a true patent troll, P, a firm that exists only to hold patents and
assert them against commercial entities. Imagine that it holds a patent that
could plausibly cover a product produced by both Firm A and Firm B, two
large commercial firms. Under this rule, P could not obtain enhanced
remedies against either Firm A or Firm B. Instead, it could choose to sell the
patent to Firm A. Firm A would be willing to pay P the expected value of
149
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P’s suit against Firm A, plus the expected value of Firm A’s potential suit
against Firm B. The expected value of that suit would involve enhanced
remedies, because Firm A manufactures a product covered by the patent. P
would have enhanced the value of its property right simply by transferring it
to a different type of party. 150 Not only would this frustrate the purpose of a
rule excluding NPEs from accessing enhanced patent remedies, it would
also create incentives for firms to expend resources on transfers of
intellectual property rights that create no social wealth whatsoever but
produce transaction costs.
This concern is mitigated somewhat by the rarity of large commercial
competitors litigating infringement suits against one another to judgment. 151
The reason is that they have too much to lose: in many cases, each firm
holds a substantial portfolio of patents that the other firm is plausibly
infringing. 152 If one firm were to file suit, it would risk a countersuit that
could be just as damaging. 153 Both firms would expend millions of dollars
in litigation costs without gaining a clear advantage. For this reason, larger
commercial firms typically prefer to enter into cross-licensing agreements
with one another, rather than litigating to judgment. 154 In addition, the
patents held by trolls may be duplicative of patents already held by these
large commercial firms—particularly when it comes to devices that are
covered by hundreds or even thousands of patents. 155 In the hands of a
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major commercial firm, one additional patent may confer little additional
value. Nonetheless, it is always possible that a patent troll would be able to
find a higher value commercial buyer for its patents, resulting in wasteful
transactions and evasion of the limits on heightened remedies.
In light of this, an industry-focused approach might be superior. This
approach takes advantage of the fact that certain industries and areas of
technology are characterized by substantial activity by NPEs and patent
trolls, and others are not. One could consider awarding enhanced rewards
only to victorious patent plaintiffs who hold patents in industries and
technical fields that do not involve significant activity by trolls:
pharmaceutical drugs, biotechnology, medical devices, chemicals, optics,
machinery, and the like. 156 Victorious plaintiffs in industries with
significant activity by patent trolls—software, computers, electronics,
semiconductors, and similar fields—would be denied access to these
enhanced remedies. In symmetric fashion, one could consider limiting the
availability of enhanced penalties to industries with substantial troll activity.
This proposal draws upon a literature suggesting that courts are already
creating different patent rules for different industries 157 and recommending
that Congress or the PTO do the same even more explicitly. 158 There is also
a direct analogy to the Supreme Court’s approach to injunctive remedies in
eBay v. MercExchange. There, several concurring justices noted that not all
industries, and not all patent plaintiffs, are equivalent. 159 Where there is an
especially high risk of patent holdup, or where there is reason to believe that
the plaintiff’s assertion of its patent rights will hinder rather than promote
innovation, the Court hinted that it disfavored injunctive relief. 160 To date,
these types of industry-by-industry adjustments have been made largely by
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the courts, 161 though Congress 162 and the PTO have intervened on very
limited occasions. 163 It may be appropriate for the courts to take the lead
again here, or it might be advantageous for Congress or an administrative
agency to play a significant role. The institutional details are interesting and
important but beyond the scope of this Article. What is important is that
industry-by-industry distinctions such as the one we are proposing are
hardly foreign to patent law.
Could this arrangement similarly be gamed by opportunistic patent
trolls? One option would be for trolls to simply cease activity in a given
industry, goading courts into offering enhanced remedies, before resuming
litigious activities. Yet this is highly improbable for any number of reasons.
If trolls could convince courts to allow enhanced remedies by ceasing
activity, courts would presumably turn the spigot back off once trolls
resumed litigating. Patent trolls would also cost themselves a tremendous
amount of money by ceasing activity simply in order to tap into greater
enhanced remedies at some future date. And patent trolls would also have to
engage in a significant amount of concerted action (actually, nonaction) in
order to implement this plan. This creates a severe collective action
problem—any given patent troll would benefit enormously from defecting
from an agreement and continuing to litigate.
A more likely possibility is that trolls might migrate from the technical
fields they currently inhabit to other industries (such as pharmaceuticals)
where the remedies are more generous. If it became standard practice for
patent trolls to “follow the money” in this fashion, 164 any strategy that relied
upon distinctions between industries would be quickly eroded.
However, it is extremely difficult—if not impossible—for patent trolls
to take up residence within another industry or technical field. The reason
has nothing to do with the expertise within those firms, or the types of
patents owned by trolls. If those were the barriers, trolls could simply hire
experts in other technical areas and purchase other patents. Rather, some
industries are simply more conducive to predatory patent behavior than
others. The reason appears to be that it is easier in some fields than in others
to specify an invention for purposes of a patent. In the pharmaceutical and
161
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chemical industries, for instance, a patentee can specify a drug or chemical
with a great deal of precision by describing the molecule involved. Any
given invention is usually covered by only a small number of significant
patents 165—hence the often-stated principle of “one molecule, one
patent.” 166 Consequently, old patents can rarely be re-interpreted in broad
fashion to cover new inventions. The opportunities for trolls are greatly
limited. It is for this reason that these industries—and others, such as
machinery and optics—are not generally thought to have many trolls
currently operating. If trolls could gain a foothold litigating in these fields,
they would already have done so; there is no reason for them to have
artificially confined their activity to certain industries. The relative absence
of troll-like behavior is therefore best understood as a function of the way in
which patents interact with and describe the relevant technology.
Accordingly, we believe that it will be possible to obtain the advantages
of enhanced remedies while minimizing the harm done by patent trolls by
limiting these enhanced remedies by industry. There will be some
definitional issues at the margins—parties may argue over whether a
particular patent covers computers or machinery, for instance—but these are
the types of issues that courts are well-equipped to decide. 167 The
distinctions we seek to draw are necessarily crude, but here these crude
distinctions may function better than either finer distinctions, which can be
gamed, or the status quo.
B. IMPLEMENTATION AND MEASUREMENT

The proposal we have described is not one that could be easily
implemented by courts under current law. To begin with, there is no
165
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provision in law that would allow courts to assess the types of enhanced
rewards and penalties that we advocate. The Patent Act permits courts to
“increase the damages [found by a jury] up to three times the amount found
or assessed,” 168 and courts have employed this provision to assess treble
damages in cases of “willful” infringement. 169 However, this provision only
allow courts to increase the amount paid by the defendant to the plaintiff.
The Patent Act also permits courts to award attorneys’ fees in
“exceptional cases.” 170 The problem with this provision of the statute is that
we propose awarding enhanced awards and penalties in essentially every
case, rather than just exceptional ones. Also, as we explained during our
discussion of the English Rule, attorneys’ fees will generally be too small to
have the desired effect. 171
In addition, our proposal relies on determining the (approximate)
accuracy of courts across patent cases. We have no illusion of courts’ ability
to ascertain this figure themselves. The judges of a court do not have the
time to scrutinize one another’s opinions for error, nor would they be eager
to point out their colleagues’ errors even if they discovered them. 172
Accordingly, legislative or administrative action will be necessary.
Congress could implement such an arrangement by legislation, or (perhaps
168
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preferably) could delegate the task to an administrative agency. 173 In either
event, a panel of outside experts should be tasked with reviewing a random
sample of completed patent cases and determining courts’ error rate.
C. SETTLEMENT

Thus far our discussion has focused on outcomes at trial, and we have
only alluded to licensing and settlement negotiations. These negotiations
make up a significant fraction of the economic activity surrounding patents,
but our general neglect of them has been deliberate. The reason is simple:
settlement and licensing occur in the shadow of expected trial outcomes. 174
The more that a plaintiff and defendant believe the plaintiff will win at trial,
the greater the amount they will settle for (in the event that they settle). 175
The less the plaintiff has to gain at trial, the lower the settlement price. 176
Accordingly, a system of enhanced rewards and penalties will increase the
amount that owners of valid, valuable patents will earn in licensing
negotiations and decrease the amount that owners of invalid patents will be
able to extract. These changes in settlement outcomes will mirror the
changes in expected trial outcomes. 177
Nor should a symmetric system of enhanced rewards and penalties
affect the likelihood of settlement. Settlement is valuable because it allows
both sides to avoid the substantial expense involved in litigating. 178 When
parties fail to settle, it is typically because they disagree on the likely
outcome of the case. 179 If either party has private information that leads her
173
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to believe that she is more likely to win, the two sides will not be able to
come to an agreement. 180 That is, the decision to litigate rather than settling
is driven by differences in information. Here, the system of enhanced
rewards and penalties introduces no private or asymmetric information.
Both parties will have the same information regarding the multipliers used
to calculate enhanced rewards and penalties, and both parties will be able to
perform the same calculations to the same degree of accuracy. If the parties
would be inclined to settle absent a system of enhanced rewards and
penalties, the introduction of that system will not dissuade them.
The one factor that could impact settlement is the proposal we outlined
above for paying victorious patent plaintiffs from general tax revenues or
via a patent term extension, rather than forcing losing defendants to pay.
The reason is that this third-party payment to plaintiffs decouples plaintiffs’
and defendants’ incentives, making trial worth more to plaintiffs if they
have valuable patents. Consider a simple numerical example. Suppose that a
plaintiff is 80% likely to prevail at trial, damages in the case will be $100
million, and the cost of litigating will be $10 million for each side. Absent a
system of enhanced rewards and penalties, plaintiff’s expected payoff from
going to trial would be:
$100 million × 0.8 – $10 million = $70 million.

Defendant’s expected payoff from going to trial would be:

–$100 million × 0.8 – $10 million = –$90 million.

Plaintiff and defendant thus should be willing to settle for any amount
between $70 million and $90 million.
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on validity, the outcome of the settlement game depends on who is able to make a final
take-it-or-leave-it offer. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under
Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. OF ECON. 404, 405, 414 (1984) (describing model in
which the less informed party makes final offer); Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde,
Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND J. ECON. 557, 558–
59 (1986) (describing model in which the better informed party has ability to make final
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Now consider the effect of adding enhanced rewards and penalties equal
to $10 million, with the reward coming via a patent term extension rather
than from defendants. Plaintiff’s expected payoff from going to trial would
be:
$110 million × 0.8 – $10 million × 0.2 - $10 million = $76 million.

Note that the plaintiff obtains an additional $10 million if she wins (with
probability 0.8), but loses $10 million if she loses (with probability 0.2).
Defendant’s expected payoff from going to trial would be:
–$100 million × 0.8 + $10 million × 0.2 – $10 million = $88 million.

Whereas the plaintiff’s enhanced gain does not come from the
defendant’s pocket, her loss does go to the defendant. Plaintiff and
defendant would then be willing to settle only for any amount between $76
million and $88 million. The available bargaining range has shrunk from
$20 million ($90 million – $70 million) to $12 million ($88 million – $76
million). This will decrease the likelihood of settlement. 181
The result will be fewer settlements on the whole and more patent trials.
This would most likely increase social welfare with respect to invalid or
dubious patents, because those patents will be invalidated at trial and cannot
later be asserted against other alleged infringers. But it will decrease social
welfare with respect to valid patents by forcing the parties to incur litigation
costs that might otherwise have been avoided. The net effects will be
ambiguous and will depend on the percentages of asserted patents that are
valid and invalid. This might constitute an argument for eschewing the
asymmetric mechanism we recommend in which plaintiffs pay enhanced
penalties to patent challengers but are paid enhanced remedies by the
public.
The important point is that enhanced rewards and penalties will improve
settlement outcomes for holders of valid patents and worsen them for
holders of invalid patents. For instance, in the numerical example above, the
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See Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (2002);
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Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 101 (1990) (“[I]t is natural—as well as customary in the legal
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midpoint of the bargaining range absent enhanced rewards and penalties is
$80 million. That midpoint rises to $82 million once enhanced rewards and
penalties are introduced. The salutary effects of enhanced rewards and
penalties will persist irrespective of whether litigants settle their cases or
proceed to trial.
D. RISK AVERSION

One concern with our proposal for enhanced rewards and penalties is
that they increase the amount of litigation risk to which the patent holder
and challenger are exposed. To the extent that these parties are risk
averse, 182 our proposal would appear to reduce these parties’ welfare. This
is not a critical objection to our basic proposal because parties can insure
against litigation risk by settling cases. In the basic settlement model we
employed in the last section, a reduction in utility or corporate welfare due
to risk aversion to larger litigation stakes operates just like a litigation
cost—it reduces the patent holder’s gain from litigating and increases the
patent challenger’s loss to litigating. The combined effect is to reduce the
parties’ utility from going to trial, making settlement even more attractive.
If the parties settle, they do not face the same litigation risk.
Interestingly, risk aversion offsets part of the problem raised by the
variant of our proposal that has enhanced rewards funded partly by
taxpayers or future consumers. In the previous section we explained that
this decoupling of enhanced rewards from defendant payments increases the
amount that the plaintiff expects to obtain at trial more than it increases the
amount that the defendant expects to pay at trial. Because the scope for
settlement is proportional to the amount that the defendant expects to pay
above and beyond what the plaintiff expects to receive, decoupled enhanced
rewards reduce the scope for settlement. For reasons we gave in the last
paragraph, however, decoupled enhanced rewards also increase the
plaintiff’s cost of litigation due to risk aversion. This reduces the payoff that
patent holders can expect from trial, offsetting some of the increased return
from decoupled enhanced rewards. The offset is not complete because the
enhanced reward is similar to a strictly positive value lottery. Positive value
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Corporate parties may behave in a risk-averse fashion either because owners or
managers are actually risk averse or because they face a risk that threatens a company’s
existence. In general, smaller firms are more likely to behave in a risk averse fashion than
larger firms, either because smaller firms have fewer and perhaps less-diversified owners
or because any given level of risk is more likely to bankrupt a small firm than a big firm.
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lotteries—for example, heads you win $5 and tails you win $10—have
positive value to both risk-averse and non-risk-averse individuals. That is,
both individuals would pay a positive amount to face the lottery, though the
risk-averse individual would be willing to pay less than the non-risk-averse
individual to face it. In summary, risk aversion reduces some (but not all) of
the anticipated returns to enhanced rewards and penalties but also
ameliorates some of the reduction in settlement rates caused by decoupled
enhanced rewards.
E. INSOLVENT PLAINTIFFS AND SHAM LAWSUITS

We close with two relatively discrete but important issues. First, it is
essential that patent plaintiffs have the capacity to pay enhanced penalties if
they lose at trial. Patent plaintiffs could conceivably evade their
responsibility for enhanced penalties by transferring their patents to underfunded shell corporations and then using those corporations to bring suit. If
the suit failed, the corporation would not have the resources to pay the
penalty judgment.
This is a real problem but one that is easily addressed. Patent plaintiffs
should be forced to either post a litigation bond or purchase insurance
against being assessed an enhanced penalty. 183 The bond or insurance
would be pegged to the damages demanded by the plaintiff: the greater the
damages, the greater the bond or insurance.
Second, and lastly, it is always possible that patent holders will take
advantage of the prospect of supplemental rewards by arranging sham
lawsuits, which they then win at trial. Sham suits present a real concern, but
they are hardly unique to this context—patent law offers numerous
opportunities for patent holders and challengers to gain advantages via
sham lawsuits. 184 As in other areas of patent law, they can be policed
through other means, principally an examination of connections between
the plaintiff and defendant in a given suit and the parties with economic
interests on both sides of the case. 185 The PTO has already begun to take
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See generally Robert J. Rhee, Bonding Limited Liability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1417 (2011) (describing the use of litigation bonds and similar instruments).
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See Timothy Denny Greene, “All Substantial Rights”: Toward Sensible Patent
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Federal law already requires that any civil action be “prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest.” FED. R. CIV. P. 17.
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steps in this direction. 186 The threat of fraud thus does not provide an
adequate basis for rejecting supplemental patent remedies.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have documented how patent challenges, patent law’s
ex post attempt to correct mistakes made by the PTO, can undermine the
initial goals of patents. Because of mistakes in the selection of patents by
challengers and errors by courts in determining which patents are valid,
patent challenges can penalize valid patents, thereby discouraging
innovation, and protect some invalid patents, sustaining deadweight loss
and taxing true innovation. One solution to the problem is to make patent
challengers and courts more accurate. Where that is difficult, we propose an
alternative, counterintuitive solution: increase the stakes in patent
challenges. We recommend that patent owners whose patents are upheld at
trial be given a reward—in the form of a patent extension—on top of the
damages they usually get in court. Similarly, patent owners whose patents
are held invalid by a court should be forced to pay a penalty to patent
challengers. This will increase the wedge between the payoffs of having a
patent upheld in courts and having it struck down by a court. So long as
courts are better than a coin flip at determining whether a patent is truly
valid, this approach will reward holders of truly valid patents and punish
holders of truly invalid patents. Courts need not be perfectly accurate for
our solution to work. Indeed, the higher stakes are a substitute for more
accuracy.
Although our proposal seems bold, it is actually fairly narrow. Whereas
we only use higher stakes to correct for skewed incentives created by
imperfect patent challenges, higher stakes can also be used to correct for
other flaws in the patent system, including the possibility that supracompetitive profits from market exclusivity may not fully capture the full
social gains from innovation 187 or that market exclusivity may discourage
follow-on innovation. 188 In some sense, this is not at all surprising. Because
the threat of damages awarded by court is ultimately how patent laws are
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enforced, those laws can be changed substantially by altering damages that
courts award.
Although manipulating the stakes in patent challenges can be used to
tackle broader issues of patent policy, the choice between addressing the
problem of imperfect challenges by increasing the accuracy of courts or by
changing the patent approval process does not depend on the resolution of
those underlying questions about patent policy. Whether one thinks that
current patent law undercompensates for innovation or that its breadth
deters future innovation, improvements in accuracy and increases in stakes
will both address the problem. The point we wish to highlight is that
increased accuracy and increased stakes are substitutes.
Although we make our two basic observations—that litigation is
mistake-prone and that higher stakes can correct some of that error—in the
context of patent challenges, it also applies outside patent law. In general, it
is important to model not just the incentive effects of a given legal rule but
also the incentives to litigate that rule. Those litigation incentives can
introduce errors into application of the basic legal rule, reducing the
efficacy of the rule. Moreover, litigation errors can be corrected either by
directly improving the accuracy of litigation or, surprisingly in some cases,
by increasing the stakes in litigation. Increasing stakes is a plausible
substitute for greater accuracy when litigants and courts, while not perfectly
accurate, are at least better than random at identifying truly legal and illegal
behavior.
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